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ABSTRACT 
 
This study investigates board diversity and its influence on financial performance. The main 
purpose of the study is to examine whether nationality and gender diversity influence 
financial performance as measured by Tobin’s Q. The study examines the biggest 50 Asia-
Pacific companies according to Forbes Magazine. Data analysis is performed using Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS) and Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS) regressions analysis. The results 
show that gender diversity of board member has a positive influence on financial 
performance. However, nationality of board member contributes no significant influence on 
financial performance. In addition to the empirical findings supporting board diversity, I also 
emphasize that an economic objective should not be the only reason for increasing board 
diversity. 
 
Keyword: financial performance, board diversity, board composition, corporate governance, 
board of director. 
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Chapter 1 
 Introduction 
 
 
This opening section consists of background and rationale of the study; research questions; 
objective or purpose to be achieved in this study; and significance or importance of the study. 
In the last part of this section, the structure of this thesis also will be presented.  
 
1.1. Background and Rationale of the Study 
 
This study investigates the influence of board diversity on financial performance. This 
empirical research is conducted in Asia-Pacific regional companies, by using Forbes Asia-
Pacific’s 50 biggest listed companies. Financial performance research is an important topic to 
be observed for all time, because financial performance is a report of management 
responsibility which is done annually to the public; especially for companies listed in stock 
exchange. Every company has an obligation to make a financial report/statement to show its 
financial performance. There are so many factors influencing financial performance of a 
company, for instance, corporate governance mechanism, board size, and board independence 
(Bozec, Dia, & Bozec, 2010; De Andres, Azofra, & Lopez, 2005; Kiel & Nicholson, 2003). 
However, this study focuses on nationality and gender diversity of board composition.    
 
In recent years, board diversity has become an emerging issue within corporate governance 
practice and research. There has been an increasing focus on studies about board composition 
such as board size, board diversity and board independence (Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 
2003; De Andres et al., 2005; Erhardt, Werbel, & Shrader, 2003). Several studies tried to 
relate board diversity with organizational performance. Carter, D'Souza, Simkins, and 
Simpson (2010) indicate that gender and ethnic diversity in board of director could lead to 
better corporate governance which leads to the more profitable business.  
 
Some countries already set the rules for board composition. Norway, for instance, has 
implemented gender quota in the board of publicly listed firms in order to improve equal 
opportunities. Norway is also the first country in the world implementing this regulation since 
2006. Norwegian government has decided a minimum 40 percent of the board members must 
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be women (Smith, Smith, & Verner, 2006). Similar to the Scandinavian countries, Spain, 
Iceland and France also passed regulation to require a quota for the number of female board 
member (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Ahern & Dittmar, 2012). In Asia, gender quota also has 
been introduced. Malaysia has imposed a 30 percent quota for women on board by 2016 (The 
Economist, 2014) and Singapore has considered to increase gender diversity in board of 
director (www.staffingindustry.com).  
 
In addition to the study of women on boards, the role of foreign board member is also widely 
discussed. For example, Choi, Park, and Yoo (2007) examine that foreign investor 
participation on board enhances firm performance in Korea. Then, Ruigrok, Peck, and 
Tacheva (2007) indicate foreign directors in Swiss corporations tend to be more independent. 
Richard (2000) also reports that racial or ethnic diversity in board of director increases value 
and finally contribute to company performance and competitive advantage.  
 
As a matter of fact, most countries in Asia do not have gender quota regulation. However, 
Asian companies have a significant number of female board members and this number is 
increasing. Besides, Asia-Pacific economy is emerging and involving huge amount of foreign 
direct investment. Therefore, foreign board members are demanded by international business 
environment as representatives of international stakeholders.  
 
Nevertheless, addressing board diversity especially quota requirement, both for female and 
foreign directors is arguable. Pro and contra appear not only from academic researcher but 
also business practitioner. Bloomberg Businessweek (2011) indicates that quota system is 
effective (pro: Toegel, 2011). The evidence shows that Norway, after implementing quota, 
climbing up from 11
th
 position in 2007 to 7
th
 in 2010 for The World Competitiveness 
Yearbook ranking. However, the same article suggests: it is not that simple to reach quota 
objective (contra: Barsoux, 2011). The lack of women on boards is a consequent of their 
underrepresentation on top executives from where boards are normally recruited. Quota 
system is deemed as coercion causing risk of alienating the quota-driven female directors, 
nicknamed as golden skirts, in the boardroom (Barsoux, 2011).  Further, when corporate 
governance focus on women on board is increasing, attention to board internationalization is 
less discussed.  The Australian Institute of Company Directors sentiment index reveals while 
40% of boards increase their gender diversity, only 21% seek increase in ethnic diversity 
(Durkin, 2013). 
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Furthermore, some previous studies prove clearly that board diversity is positively associated 
with firm financial performance (Carter et al., 2003; Erhardt et al., 2003; Kiel & Nicholson, 
2003). On the contrary, the other studies show the opposite result: there is no significant 
relationship between board diversity and financial performance (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; 
Carter et al., 2010; De Andres et al., 2005; Rose, 2007). Despite there has been mixed 
evidence regarding the effect of board diversity on performance, diversity in board 
composition is still considered favorable based on these two important reasons (Kang, Cheng, 
& Gray, 2007). Firstly, diversity increases discussion, exchange of ideas and group 
performance. A more diverse board provides different insights and perspectives in facing 
problem and finding solution. This eventually will improve organizational value and 
performance through better decision making. Secondly, the function of corporate boards is to 
protect stakeholders’ interest. As a consequence, the board should comprise members that are 
representative of company’s stakeholders. Having a more diverse board can be seen as a good 
way to be more ‘representative’.  
 
Henceforth, board diversity, specifically in gender and nationality, will be the main focus in 
this research whereby their influence on firm financial performance will be examined further. 
Study will be conducted on the 50 best of Asia-Pacific's biggest listed companies according to 
Forbes magazine. These companies have more than $3 billion in their revenue or market 
capitalization. They are selected based on solid financial track combined with great 
management and entrepreneurial skill.   
 
Based on the data from those top Asia-Pacific companies, hypothesis test is conducted using 
multiple regression analysis. The finding of this study indicates that gender diversity in board 
composition have a positive effect on firm financial performance. However, having foreign 
board member shows no significant influence on firm performance. Deeper insight for 
discussing both nationality and gender diversity of board composition express the problem of 
endogeneity. The relationship of board diversity and firm financial performance is not 
unidirectional causality (Oxelheim, Gregoric, Randoy, & Thomsen, 2013). It is difficult to 
isolate whether board diversity drives or is driven by firm performance. I will try to discuss 
endogenous issues in relation to this research, however, this challenge is virtually impossible 
to completely eliminated (Oxelheim et al., 2013). 
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1.2. Research questions 
 
Research questions express research objectives in terms of questions which can be addressed 
by research (Zikmund, Babin, Carr, & Griffin, 2013).  Research question is also known as 
problem statement; a clear, precise and succinct statement related to a specific issue of which 
researcher want to investigate (Sekaran & Bougie, 2010). Sekaran and Bougie (2010) also 
explain that a well-defined research question should meet three criteria: relevant, feasible and 
interesting. A research question is relevant when it is useful for managerial or (and) academic 
perspectives (Sekaran & Bougie, 2010). It is feasible if solvable within project restrictions. 
Then, it is interesting enough to motivate researcher staying throughout the whole research 
process.  
 
Based on the background and rationale of this study, there are two research questions that will 
be discussed: 
RQ1: Does nationality of board member influence financial performance?  
RQ2: Does gender diversity of board member influence financial performance? 
 
1.3. Objective of the study 
 
This research is a purposive process. Research objective or research purpose is the goal to be 
achieved in doing research (Zikmund et al., 2013). The objective of this study is to examine 
whether nationality and gender diversity of board member influence financial performance of 
companies. Nationality and gender diversity will be the main variables analyzed in this 
research through hypothesis testing. This objective/purpose is important because the result of 
this study will contribute as new evidence from Asia-Pacific for the influence of board 
diversity on company performance. 
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1.4. Significance of the study 
 
In managing diversity on board of director, it is important to consider local circumstances as 
well instead of relying only on research from other countries (Ruigrok et al., 2007). Majority 
of research conducted on corporate board topic use US or European corporations as sample. 
Presenting another geographical point of view, this study will be conducted in Asia-Pacific 
firms. The result of the study hopefully could contribute more for academics and business 
practice and present additional evidence of nationality and gender diversity effects on firm 
financial performance, particularly in Asia. 
 
1.5. Presentation of the study 
 
The arrangement of presenting a research report is very important. A systematic structure is 
necessary to be considered.  This master thesis is divided into six chapters. The first part is 
introduction, followed by theoretical frameworks and research methods. Then, data analysis 
and results are presented and after that findings and discussions. Finally, conclusion will be 
the closing chapter. The systematic organization of this master thesis will be presented as 
follows. 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
The first chapter briefly explains about background and rationale of the study; research 
questions; objective of the study; significance of the study; and presentation of the study.  
 
Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework 
In this chapter, theoretical framework based on literature study will be presented then 
followed by hypothesis formulation and research model. 
 
Chapter 3: Research Methods 
This chapter consists of research design, data collection, sample, and research method 
employed in this study. 
 
Chapter 4: Data Analysis and Results  
Various tests conducted for data analysis will be explained in this chapter.  Then, the result 
will be presented and examined. 
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Chapter 5: Findings and Discussions 
The fifth chapter summarizes research findings and discusses the implication of those 
findings. 
 
Chapter 6: Conclusions 
Finally, after analyzing the data and discussing the findings, the last chapter consists of 
conclusions, limitations, and recommendation for future studies.   
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Chapter 2 
 Theoretical Framework 
 
The second section of this master thesis is a literature review. Relevant theories and former 
studies are presented and elaborated with respect to the topic of this research. Theory is a 
formal and logical explanation of phenomena that includes explanation of how things are 
related each other (Zikmund et al., 2013). The discussion is started with financial performance 
explanation and followed by some reviews of corporate governance as the general topic of the 
research. Then, it is continued with more specific theories about corporate governance, 
especially regarding board diversity. Thereafter, based on the theory, the research hypothesis 
will be formulated in the end of this section followed by the research model.  
 
 
2.1. Financial Performance 
Financial performance is related to firm’s ability to generate profit or income. It is often used 
as a general measure of business results; how well company doing its business activities. It 
can also be used to compare among companies within an industry. There is a wide range of 
financial performance measures. However, financial performance is basically divided into 
three general categories: investor returns, accounting returns and perceptual (Cochran & 
Wood, 1984; Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Rynes, 2003).  
 
Firstly, investor returns are measured based on shareholders perspectives (Cochran & Wood, 
1984). These are market based measures of financial performance, for instance, share prices 
or share price appreciation. They are related with stock market process, which relies on stock 
return and risk, to determine stock price and also market value (Orlitzky et al., 2003).  
 
Secondly, another alternative for measuring financial performance is accounting returns. The 
examples are earning per share (EPS), price to earnings ratio, return on investment (ROI), 
return on asset (ROA), and any other traditional accounting ratios. These measures are related 
to managerial policies: how management allocates funds to different projects. Therefore, they 
express internal managerial performance and decision making capability, rather than external 
market response (Orlitzky et al., 2003). 
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Lastly, perceptual measure of financial performance is related to survey. The survey aims to 
obtain respondent estimation of company financial performance, for example, company ‘wise 
use of assets’, ‘soundness of financial position’, or ‘financial achievement compared with 
competitors’ (Conine and Madden 1987; Reimann 1975; Wartick 1988 in Orlitzky et al., 
2003). However, compared to the two measures mentioned earlier, this measure seems to be 
the most subjective.   
 
 
2.2. Corporate Governance 
 
As for corporate governance theory, Thomsen and Conyon (2012) define corporate 
governance as the control and direction of companies by ownership, board, company law, 
incentive, and other mechanisms. Charkham (1994) in Thomsen and Conyon (2012) proposes 
a broader definition: “the way companies are run”. Furthermore, Monks and Minow (2008) 
mention that corporate governance is a mechanism that focuses on the balance relationship of 
the three actors: management, board of director and owner. Supporting their definition, 
Moffett, Stonehill, and Eiteman (2006) indicate the relationship among those actors 
determines and controls the strategic direction and performance of an organization.  
According to Thomsen and Conyon (2012), there are several mechanisms of corporate 
governance in which some are more important than others. Those mechanisms are informal 
governance, regulation, ownership, boards, incentive systems, and stakeholder pressure. Each 
mechanism has its own cost and benefits. However, most of them are needed to improve 
company economic performance.  
Further, corporate governance is important to ensure good management system which is 
essential for good economic performance. The scandals in the past such as Enron (US), 
WorldCom (US), Olympus (Japan), Satyam (India) etc. have shown that the role of corporate 
governance becomes dramatically clear. It is therefore very important to establish a 
governance structure, which on one side allows management and entrepreneur to do their best, 
and on the other side holds them accountable to investor if they also use other people’s money 
in their business (Thomsen, 2008). As a matter of fact, the main objective of corporate 
governance in shareholder wealth model is optimizing returns to shareholders or investors. In 
order to achieve this objective, practice of good corporate governance should focus on board 
of director to develop and implement strategy to ensure corporate growth and value 
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improvement as well as to assure other stakeholder’s interest to be accommodated (Moffett et 
al., 2006).  
 
 
Figure 2.1: Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
Source: Thomsen and Conyon (2012) 
 
One of the most widely accepted practices of good corporate governance is the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) principles of corporate governance. It 
was established in 1999 and revised in 2004. The OECD realizes that ‘one size does not fit 
all’. Hence, these principles represent only common characteristics that are fundamental in 
corporate governance (Mallin, 2010). The revised principles are as follows. 
 
 
 
 
The Mechanisms of Governance 
Informal Governance 
- Social Norms 
- Reputation and Trust  
- Codes 
Regulation 
- Company laws 
Ownership 
- Large owners 
- Shareholder activism 
- Take over 
Boards 
Incentive systems (pay)  
Stakeholder pressure 
- Creditor monitoring 
- Auditors 
- Analysts 
- Competition 
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OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
I. Ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance framework 
II. The rights of the shareholders and key ownership functions 
III. The equitable treatment of shareholders 
IV. The role of stakeholders in corporate governance 
V. Disclosure and transparency 
VI. The responsibilities of the board 
Figure 2.2: The OECD Principles 
Source: http://www.oecd.org/ 
Among those principles of OECD, the most relevant to this study is the sixth principle: The 
Responsibilities of the Board. As stated in OECD (2004), corporate governance framework 
should ensure firms’ strategic guidance, effective monitoring of management by the board, 
and board’s accountability to company and shareholders. This means board function, as one 
of the main mechanisms of corporate governance, should work well and accountable in 
monitoring management. Boards should work in the best interest of company and 
shareholders, be fully informed basis, should treat all stakeholders’ interest fairly and apply 
high ethical standards. Further elaboration about board of director will be discussed in the 
next section. 
 
2.2. Board of Director 
 
According to Kang et al. (2007), board of directors is one of a number of internal governance 
mechanisms which are intended to ensure that the interests of shareholders and managers are 
closely aligned. Other researchers, Thomsen and Conyon (2012), support that board is a 
generic corporate governance mechanism that are elected by shareholder to monitor the 
company. As a control mechanism, boards play an important role in corporate governance. 
Board provides useful function as an intermediary between owner and management. When 
other corporate governance mechanisms are weak, board inefficiency could be costly to the 
company and even to the society as a whole (De Andres et al., 2005). In consonance with the 
principles made by OECD (2004), board of director should fulfill certain key functions as 
follows. 
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1. Board of director should guide and review corporate strategy, risk policy, major plan 
of action, annual budget and business plan; set performance objective; monitor 
implementation and corporate performance; and oversee major capital expenditure, 
acquisition and divestiture.  
2. Board of director should monitor the effectiveness of company’s governance practice 
and change if needed. 
3. Board of director should select, monitor and compensate, or if necessary, replace key 
executive and oversee succession planning.  
4. Board of director should align key executive and board remuneration with the longer 
term interests of the company and its shareholders.  
5. Board of director should ensure a formal and transparent board nomination and 
election process.  
6. Board of director should manage and monitor potential conflict of interest of 
management, board member and shareholder, including misuse of corporate assets and 
abuse in related party transactions. 
7. Board of director should ensure the integrity of corporate accounting and financial 
reporting systems, including independent audit, and that appropriate control systems 
are in place, particularly, risk management system, operational and financial control 
system, and compliance with the law and relevant standard.  
8. Board of director should oversee the process of communication and disclosure. 
In addition to board function, there are three basic roles of board of director according to 
Oxelheim et al. (2013): monitoring role, advisory role and resource provision role. Monitoring 
is the process of hiring, promoting and assessing management while advisory role is about 
directors’ involvement in firms’ strategy (Adams et al., 2010 in Oxelheim et al., 2013). Then, 
resource provision role refers to how directors can provide access to key resources for 
company (Pearce & Zahra, 1992; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978 in Oxelheim et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, board system is divided into one-tier (or unitary) board and two-tier (or dual) 
board system. One-tier board system is characterized by one single board in which consists of 
executive and non-executive directors. Directors in one-tier board are elected by shareholders 
and responsible for all aspects of company activities. Meanwhile, two-tier board system 
consists of executive or management board and supervisory board. Management board runs 
the business whilst supervisory board oversees the direction of business and supervises 
management board. In this case, there is a clear separation of management and control: a 
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member of one board cannot be member of another board. Supervisory board is elected by 
shareholder while management board is appointed by supervisory board (Kim, Nofsinger, & 
Mohr, 2010; Mallin, 2010). The examples of countries with one-tier board system are India, 
Singapore, and Malaysia while China, Indonesia and Taiwan are the examples of countries 
that have two-tier board system.  
There are some implications of the different board systems. For example, one-tier board 
allows closer relationship and better information flow because all directors are in the same 
level. On the other hand, two-tier board system is more distinct and formal. However, both 
systems have many similarities. Corporate governance codes also have common approach to 
both practices in terms of function, committees, independence, etc. 
Discussing about codes related to board of director, there is one which has great influence in 
corporate governance practice; that is Cadbury Code of Best Practice. The Combined Code 
Section A: Director is presented in the following figure. Every point in the codes emphasize 
central role of board of director. The second point, for instance, addresses CEO duality. 
Several companies nowadays have CEO who in the same time also becomes a member of the 
board, or even chairman of the board. In this case, there should be a clear separation between 
both roles so that abuse of power can be avoided. The third point in the codes is related to 
board independence and will be explained in another section. In regard to the sixth point, 
board of directors also should be evaluated regarding their performance. Performance can be 
measured based on several criteria such as shareholder return, share price, earning per share, 
profit-based measures, return on capital employed, or other individual performance measures. 
Measuring board performance is very important especially to determine their compensations. 
Board compensation can encompass salary, bonus, stock option, share plan, pension and other 
benefits (Mallin, 2010). Finally, the other points of the codes are also equally important.  
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Figure 2.3: The Cadbury Code 
Source: Mallin (2010) 
 
 
 
The Combined Code 
Section 1 Companies 
A. Directors 
The Board 
1. Every company should be headed by an effective board, which is responsible 
collectively for the success of the company. 
Chairman and chief executive  
2. There should be a clear division of responsibilities between the running board and 
the executive responsibility for the running of the company’s business. No one 
individual should have unfettered powers of decision. 
Board balance and independence 
3. The board should include a balance of executive and non-executive directors (and 
in particular independent non-executive directors). No individual or small group of 
individuals can dominate board’s decision making. 
Appointments to the Board 
4. There should be a formal, transparent and rigorous procedure for the appointment 
of new directors to the board  
Information and professional development 
5. The board should be supplied with information in a timely manner and in an 
appropriate quality to enable it to discharge its duties. All directors should receive 
induction on joining the board and should regularly update their skills and 
knowledge. 
Performance evaluation 
6. The board should undertake a formal and rigorous annual evaluation of its own 
performance, its committees and its individual directors. 
Re-election 
7. All directors should be submitted for re-election at regular intervals, subject to 
continued satisfactory performance. The board should ensure planned and 
progressive refreshing of the board. 
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Additionally, The National Association of Corporate Director (NACD) also published a report 
on the performance evaluation of CEOs, boards, and directors. Their subsequent reports on 
director professionalism, strategic planning and audit committee have been influential in 
promoting policies such as director stock ownership, special meeting only for outsider 
director, ensuring director independency, and so on (Monks & Minow, 2008).  
 
2.2.1. Board Size 
 
Another important issue in board structure is board size, which might be varied from one 
company to others. Ten members are considered to be typical for medium to large company 
(Thomsen & Conyon, 2012). However, this can vary and not every company has a board 
system. Having board of director is not mandatory. To some extent, this depends on the size 
of the firm. Under these circumstances, a number of small-medium enterprise or microfinance 
organization often has relatively smaller board size. Furthermore, larger firms normally 
require greater number of board member to monitor larger firm activities. The ability of the 
board to monitor can increase as more directors added. However, this benefit can be 
outweighed by the costs in terms of the poorer communication and decision-making within 
larger group (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993 in De Andres et al., 2005; Kiel and 
Nicholson, 2003).  
 
Studies show an inverse relationship between firm value and board size (Yermack, 1996; 
Eisenberg et al., 1998 in De Andres et al., 2005). Small board size is more effective. In other 
words, oversized board of director might lead to worse performance. For instance, the case of 
free-rider might appear and reduce board effectiveness. Moreover, financial market shows 
positive reaction toward board downsizing announcement. However, empirical evidence to 
board size and its influence now is getting ambiguous because some other studies find 
conflicting evidences (Dalton et al., 1998; Coles et al., 2008 in Thomsen & Conyon, 2012). 
Thus, it is difficult to draw the robust conclusion and still there is no consensus here. One 
reason of this inaccurate causal interpretation could be that board size is endogenous 
(Thomsen & Conyon, 2012). 
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2.2.2. Board Independence 
 
Equally important as board size, company should also focus on board independence. The 
board is composed of both employee of the organization (executive or insider) and senior or 
influential nonemployee (non-executive or outsider) (Moffett et al., 2006). At least one-third 
of the board should be nonexecutive director, a majority of whom should be independent 
(McGee, 2010). Being independent in this case is they are not currently non-executive; they 
were not employee of the company in the past years; they do not have current business 
relationship with the company; they are not an immediate family of an executive officer of the 
firm and so on. Thus, being non-executive only is not independent enough. Company then 
should also disclose biographies of its board members and make a statement to define their 
independence.  
Further, directors are elected by shareholder’s vote and their appointment should be made by 
a nomination committee, in which independent director supposed to play a key role (OECD, 
2004). Most of companies also have risk committee; ethics committee; executive committee; 
finance committee; etc. This might be different; it depends on the company but the most 
important committees are nomination committee, audit committee and remuneration 
committee (Kim et al., 2010; Mallin, 2010). Normally in large companies, they should meet 
every quarter for 3-4 hours up to the whole day (McGee, 2010; Thomsen & Conyon, 2012). 
Discussing further about this matter, specific board committees are best served by 
independent director, for instance, audit committee or committee that determine CEO 
compensation. However, for committees making decision about financing and long term 
investment are best served by insiders (Kim et al., 2010). Overall, studies and expert reports 
on corporate governance suggest balance proportion of inside and outside directors on board 
since both skills and functions are essential (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003).  
 
2.3. Corporate Governance and Board of Director in Asia 
 
 
After generally discussing about board of director, this section gives an overview about 
corporate governance and board of director particularly in Asia. Corporate governance 
practice in Asia is to large extent influenced by ownership structure. For instance, dominant 
shareholders in Japan are typically banks or industrial groups (keiretsu) while in South Korea 
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are often family groups or conglomerates (chaebol). In Malaysia, families are also often being 
dominant shareholders whereas in Chinese companies, state government still has the biggest 
influence (Mallin, 2010). As one of corporate governance mechanisms, board of directors 
might also vary in Asia.  
 
2.3.1. Japan 
 
In Japan, main business form is public limited company which is predominantly owned by 
keiretsu, a very strong interfirm network (Mallin, 2010). The legal system is based on civil 
law, which is similar to Germany. Besides, Japan is a country with predominantly bank-based 
rather than equity or market based financial system (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). In this case, 
banks are the key financial institutions financing the firms. Bankers also monitor companies, 
sometimes even more than shareholders. However, banks shareholdings have been reduced 
since Japan financial deregulation (Ahmadjian and Okumura, 2010 in Thomsen and Conyon 
2012).  
 
According to Thomsen and Conyon (2012), Japan applies one tier board system although it 
use element of a two-tier system with a statutory board of auditors. The board of auditors 
mainly focuses on auditing and does not ratify strategic decisions. The board normally also 
forms various committees such as compensation or nominating committees in which outside 
director is appointed as chairman for each committees (Mallin, 2010). Historically, in the past 
board size is large up to 30-40 members but it has been shrinking over the years. Boards are 
also comprised primarily by inside directors. Kaplan and Minton (1994) in Thomsen and 
Conyon (2012) explain that in case of poor performance, there is a higher probability 
shareholder will appoint outside director in replacement of incumbent executives. This is 
because corporate shareholders play important monitoring and disciplinary roles in Japan.  
 
2.3.2. South Korea 
 
Public limited company with family or corporate cross-holding (chaebols) as shareholders is 
the major business form in Korea (Mallin, 2010). The company law is common law. In Korea, 
conglomeration is very powerful and often shows lack of transparency. However, lately a 
group of activist has established People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) 
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which improves governance practice of Korean firms to protect minority shareholders 
(Mallin, 2010).  
 
In South Korea, board system is one-tier or unitary system. Board activities include: setting 
corporate goals; approving business strategies; supervising and controlling management 
activities; and also ensuring information disclosure (Mallin, 2010). Internal committees might 
be set up such as audit, operation and remuneration committees. Independent directors should 
be minimum 25 percent of the board and 50 percent of the board for financial institutions or 
large public companies. Independent directors should be able to perform their duties 
independently from management, shareholder and corporation. It is also recommended to 
have regular meeting for independent directors only and management to enable fuller 
perspectives of management issues (Mallin, 2010).  
 
2.3.3. China 
 
Main business forms in China are state-owned enterprises and joint stocks companies (Mallin, 
2010). China has a civil law system. This country seems to combine both Anglo-Saxon and 
Continental European model in its corporate governance pattern (Thomsen & Conyon, 2012). 
China promotes stock options to motivate executives similar to American model but adopts 
dual board system as in German model (Thomsen & Conyon, 2012). 
 
According to Thomsen and Conyon (2012), Chinese government plays major role in 
controlling business. This leads to conflict of interests between controlling shareholders and 
minority shareholders. Fan, Wong and Zhang (2007) in Thomsen and Conyon (2012) reveal 
that one-quarter of the CEOs in a sample of 790 Chinese firms are bureaucrats or former  
government bureaucrats. Additionally, the firms with politically connection show worse 
performance than those without political connection. However, corporate governance 
innovations have been performed in recent years to increase transparency and protect minority 
investors, for instance, by adding independent directors or improving incentive arrangements 
(Thomsen & Conyon, 2012).  
In China, board of directors operates two-tier board system consisting of a supervisory board 
and a main board of director (Thomsen & Conyon, 2012). However, the supervisory board is 
an auditor that can give recommendation but do not embark in day to day activities of the 
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main board. Board size consists of ten member or more. Traditionally, Chinese government 
has a great influence in board appointment but it is revealed that the appointed bureaucrats are 
often ineffective. Due to reformation and shareholder pressure, China increasingly adopts 
Anglo-Saxon governance practice which includes having key committees of audit, 
compensation and governance (Fan et al., 2007; Hu et al., 2010; Allen et al., 2005; Jingu, 
2007; and Chen et al., 2010 in Thomsen and Conyon 2012). In that way, independency is 
improved. Then, Chinese board structure significantly increases the number of independent 
non-executive directors because non-executive only is not necessarily independent.  
 
2.3.4. Australia 
 
Located in Asia-Pacific, Australia seems to develop the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance 
model which is adopted from the United Kingdom. Australia has a common law system. The 
main business form is public corporations with predominant institutional, corporate or family 
ownerships (Mallin, 2010). The board structure is one-tier board system. Australia applies 
‘the essentials of corporate governance principles’ which is not mandatory but helping as 
implementation guidance. There are five recommendations related to board of director as 
follows (Mallin, 2010). 
- Majority of the board should comprise independent directors 
- Chairman of the board should be an independent director 
- Roles of CEO and chairman of the board should not be exercised by the same person 
- Board of director should form a nomination committee 
- Various information about the board such as board experience or board meeting 
attendance should be presented in company’s annual report  
 
2.3.5. Malaysia  
 
Next, we are going to discuss about Malaysian corporate governance practice. Malaysia has a 
lot of family-owned or family-controlled companies. This country uses common law system. 
Bumiputra (the Malaysian people) shareholders also have important influences in governance 
system as Malaysian government try to increase their involvement in corporate sector  
(Mallin, 2010). 
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Malaysia has one-tier board system. This country encourages its listed company to have an 
effective balanced board comprised of executive and non executives directors. At least one-
third of the board should be independent non-executive directors (Mallin, 2010). These are 
some of responsibilities of the board: ensuring proper management and strategic direction of 
the company; ensuring appropriate risk management system; reviewing internal control 
system of the company; etc. Then, board should meet regularly and should have access to a 
company secretary who should ensure the board provides appropriate information for 
corporate and statutory requirements (Malin, 2010). They could also get access to 
independent professional advisor if it is needed (Malin, 2010). 
 
2.3.6. Indonesia 
 
The last country to discuss concerning with its board of director, is Indonesia. Similar with the 
other Asian countries, family ownership and conglomeration play important roles in this 
country. The company law is operated by using civil law system. Indonesia seems to develop 
its corporate governance system which is adopted from Continental European model as 
reflected in its board system.  
 
Indonesia applies two-tier board systems consisting of board of commissioners and board of 
directors. Board of director is a part of management or executive while board of 
commissioners more or less plays the role of supervisory board. Each of them has a clear 
authority and responsibility based on their functions. Board of commissioners is responsible 
in advising board of director but not allowed to make operational decision. Committees are 
normally formed in Indonesian board of director, such as audit committee, nomination and 
remuneration committee, risk policy committee and corporate governance committee 
("Indonesia's Code of Good Corporate Governance," 2006).   
 
2.3.7. Asian Study on Corporate Governance 
In the light of OECD (2004), McGee (2009) has conducted a comparative study about 
corporate governance in Asia. This study compares 10 Asian countries and the data was 
obtained from the World Bank. As presented below, this is the finding which is related to 
responsibilities of the board in Asia.   
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Figure 2.4: Responsibility of the board in Asia 
Source: McGee (2009) 
Higher score implies better responsibilities of the board on that particular country. India has 
the highest score which means that Indian board has the best responsibilities criteria. 
Meanwhile, Vietnam is in the low end. There are several criteria assessed for responsibilities 
of the board in McGee (2010): due diligence and care; fair treatment of shareholder; 
compliance with law; fulfillment of board functions; independence from management and 
access to accurate, relevant and timely information.  
 
2.4. Board Diversity and Firm Performance 
 
 
Among the most significant corporate governance issues faced by modern corporations are 
those related to diversity, such as gender, age, nationality and independence of directors. 
Board diversity is defined as variety in the composition of the board (Kang et al., 2007). This 
is divided into observable diversity and less visible diversity (Milliken and Martins, 1996 in 
Kang et al., 2007). Observable diversity consists of detectable attributes such as gender, 
ethnic or nationality and age. Meanwhile, less visible diversity is about background of the 
directors, for instances, education or previous experience. According to Erhardt et al. (2003), 
observable diversity is also called demographic diversity and less visible diversity is called 
called non-observable or cognitive diversity.  
Presently, the majority of the board members in Western firms are white middle-aged males 
from the home country of the firm. This implies a limited degree of board diversity.  As Hilb 
(2012) highlighted, board diversity is important to the creation of new idea , and the best way 
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to maximize differences is to mix ages, cultures, disciplines, genders, and so on. It should be 
noted that diversity can only become a competitive advantage when it is well managed. A 
diverse board should be created based on criteria relevant to strategy. There is no such thing 
as an ideal board composition. An optimal board composition depends on the nature of the 
firm and its context (Macus, 2002 in Hilb, 2012).   
In the following figure, Hilb (2012) also proposes comparative strengths of board members of 
different gender and national culture. According to him, female or male board members might 
come from hard or soft culture as their national backgrounds. Among hard culture 
characteristics are assertive, competitive, focus on short-term results and task-oriented whilst 
soft culture characteristics are empathetic, cooperative, long-term and relationship oriented. A 
good example for hard culture is United States and for soft culture is Japan. In this case, 
nationality is regarded as a reflection of culture.   
 
 
Figure 2.5: Comparative strengths of board members of different gender and national culture 
Source: Hilb (2012) 
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As aforementioned, culture or nationality and gender as the components of board diversity 
should be well managed to be useful. Hilb (2012) also confirms that board diversity can be a 
competitive advantage or disadvantage depends on these statements: 
a. Board diversity should never be more complex than the reality. If your company 
operates only in Japan for example, you might not need an American board member. 
b. Board diversity only adds value if each board member knows their own identity and 
the identities the other members along with their strengths and weaknesses.  
Henceforth, this research addresses nationality and gender diversity. Both can enable different 
perspectives given that men and women may approach issues from different point of view and 
has different behavioral pattern (Mallin, 2010). Moreover, individuals from different ethnic 
backgrounds may bring additional cultural insights to the board room. 
 
Before presenting previous studies in board diversity and firm performance, a theoretical 
perspective will be presented in the following sections. Four main theories of corporate 
governance, namely agency theory; resource dependency theory; human capital theory; and 
stakeholder theory will be elaborated as they are relevant to this study. 
 
2.4.1. Agency theory 
 
The first theory is agency theory. It concerns with aligning the interest of owner and manager 
in which normally there is an inherent conflict between them (Fama and Jensen, 1983 in 
Nicholson and Kiel, 2007). In this case, the owner is the principal while the management is 
the agent. Agent is the party doing something for the principal. Whenever someone does 
something for somebody else, agency problem will manifest (Thomsen & Conyon, 2012). 
Due to separation of ownership and control between owner and manager, agency problem 
arise in this principal-agent relationship. Owner of companies have to make sure that 
managers do not behave or act opportunistically by using company resources for their own 
benefits. Hence, agency cost appears. Agency cost is the cost caused by manager misusing 
their position as well as the cost of monitoring them to prevent power abuse. In owner-
manager relationships, this cost is inevitable (Blair, 1996 in Mallin 2010; Jensen and 
Mecking, 1976 in Nicholson and Kiel, 2007). 
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Agency theory addresses the relationship between owner and manager. Hence, the 
intervention of the board is needed to reduce the agency conflict between owners and 
managers. In a company, shareholders are unable to always monitor management due to 
limitations such as cost and capability. Minority shareholders, for instance, will be difficult to 
always monitor management performance of the company they invest their money to. 
Therefore, shareholders appointed board of directors to monitor management and ensure their 
interest. In the light of agency theory, scholars argue that board structure arises from choices 
taken by economic actors in response to governance issues face by the firm (Adams et al., 
2010 in Oxelheim et al., 2013). Moreover, agency theory express that a greater proportion of 
independent directors will be more capable to monitor company because managers will have 
less opportunity to pursue self-interest (Nicholson & Kiel, 2007).  
 
In another reference, Carter et al. (2003) highlight that a more diverse board might be better in 
monitoring management; because board diversity increases board independence. Board of 
directors with heterogeneity in gender, ethnicity or cultural backgrounds might bring issues or 
questions that would not come from directors with traditional characteristics. This leads to a 
more active board. In addition, high equity ownership by directors increases the willingness of 
directors to monitor management (Jensen, 1993; Monks Minow, 2004 in Carter et al., 2010). 
Dewatripont et al. (1999) and Westphal and Milton (2000) as cited in Francoeur Francoeur, 
Labelle, and Sinclair-Desgagné (2008) identify agency-theoretic rationale that women or 
foreigner often bring fresh perspectives on complex issues in the board room. Consequently, 
this might help to cope with informational bias or limitation faced by the board in decision 
making. 
 
Furthermore, board diversity is associated with the effectiveness and quality of monitoring 
function of the boards.  According to Erhardt et al. (2003) CEO may have influence on the 
board of directors. Consequently, agency theory suggests that CEO needs independent 
oversight. Hence, a diverse board and the subsequent conflict which is considered to occur 
commonly within a diverse group dynamics will provide better controlling function (Erhardt 
et al., 2003). This is eventually can also be used as a mechanism to minimize potential agency 
problem. 
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Nevertheless, agency theory is criticized to be too Anglo-Saxon specific (Phan & Yoshikawa, 
2000). Discussing from Asia-Pacific point of view, ownerships in Asia-Pacific companies are 
rather different from companies in Anglo-Saxon countries. For example, conglomerations, 
government-owned enterprises, and business networks are commonly more important in Asia; 
with phenomena such as keiretsu in Japan and chaebol in Korea. In spite of this difference, 
we still argue that agency theory is relevant in Asia-Pacific setting. Although ownership 
characteristics are different, owners as the principal still need to ensure management behavior. 
Moreover, due to global market exposure, Asia-Pacific companies are demanded to increase 
their transparency. For instance, when an Asia-Pacific company is listed on US stock 
exchange, this company should provide sufficient disclosure as required. Phan and Yosikawa 
(2000) even find that managers who are exposed to financial market discipline make more 
efficient investment decisions compared to those who are protected from such discipline by 
being members of a keiretsu.  
 
 
2.4.2. Resource dependence theory 
 
The second theory, resource dependence theory (RDT) studies how external resources of 
company affect its behavior and strategy. Company should have control of its critical 
resources so that it is not dependent to other parties. This theory is related to the contact role 
of board of director in which companies seek to manage external dependency by forming 
ownership ties and board connections (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978 in Nicolson and Kiel, 2007; 
Thomsen and Conyon, 2012). Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) in Hillman, Cannella, and Harris 
(2002) suggest four primary benefits for the external linkages such as board of directors:  
 provision of specific resources such as expertise, information or advice from 
individuals with experience in a variety of areas; 
 creation of channels of communication to the firm;  
 provision of commitments of support from important organizations in external 
environment; and 
 creation of legitimacy for the firm.  
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In Asia, the contact role of the board as emphasized in resource dependence theory is very 
important. Thomsen and Conyon (2012) state China is a good example for this matter. In 
China where political connection is extraordinary important, it will be a good idea to have 
board members with political background.  Board ties and connections provide opportunities 
and access to valuable resources for Asia-Pacific companies. Hillman et al. (2000) in Carter et 
al. (2010) extend resource dependence theory and suggest that different types of directors 
provide different beneficial resources to the company, such as: advice, legitimacy, outside 
information, etc. Hence, a more diverse board will provide more variations and more valuable 
resources which lead to better firm performance. 
 
Among other corporate governance theories, resource dependence theory provides the most 
convincing theoretical basis for board diversity and its effect on firm performance. 
Concerning with this, Carter et al. (2010) point out that gender and ethnic diversity in the 
board provide unique information sets for management to make better decision. Diverse 
directors give access to important constituencies in external environments. Moreover, board 
diversity sends positive signals to the market and diverse directors bring various perspectives 
and non-traditional approaches to problem solving. To support that, Ruigrok et al. (2007) add 
that the increasing internationalization of business leads to a higher demand for directors who 
possess necessary knowledge and contacts in foreign markets. In this case, foreign director 
might be qualified and be able to link the company to different contexts of the countries in 
which it operates. Likewise, with the increasing involvement of women in business world, the 
importance of female representation on corporate boards is also rising (Burke, 1997; Burke 
and Mattis, 2000; Carpenter et al., 2001 in Ruigrok, 2007).  
 
 
2.4.3. Human capital theory 
 
The third is human capital theory. This theory is also relevant to explain the relationship 
between board diversity and firm performance. According to Becker (1964), human capital 
theory addresses to the role of a person’s stock of education, experience, and skills that can be 
used for organization (Terjesen, Sealy, and Singh, 2009 in Carter 2010). Human capital 
characteristics are skills and experiences that individual director brings to decision-making 
process (Johnson, Schnatterly, & Hill, 2013). Director characters are unique resources and 
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these will affect what directors pay attention to as well as how they frame decisions. Human 
capital theorists suggest that individuals should be selected and promoted based on their 
quality of academic training and experience rather than gender and racial attributes (Peterson, 
Philpot, & O' Shaughnessy, 2007). 
 
In 2012, Australia discussed quota requirement that one-third of the board member should 
have Asian experience but this is criticized (Hyland, 2012). Having a deep Asian experience 
would be very beneficial for Australian board member to be more competent in monitoring or 
dealing with Asian market. While the percentage of non-executive female directors has 
increased from 14.4% in 2012 to 17.8 in 2013, the percentage of Asia-born directors in 
Australian board still remains stagnant (Durkin, 2013). Another possible way to enhance 
board diversity is to have Asian board member in addition or in substitution to international 
experience of national director. Hence, it is obvious that enhancing board diversity as 
reflected in human capital theory is important.  
 
According to Carter et al. (2010), human capital theory predicts board performance will be 
affected by board diversity as a result of unique human capital. Human capital theory 
complements the concept associated with board diversity as derived from resource 
dependence theory. In addition, Hillman et al. (2002) argue that company appoint women and 
foreign directors who have specialized skills or advanced educations to complement executive 
experience of business experts. In line with this, Peterson et al. (2007) state that African-
American directors assume different roles on the board relative to the Caucasian directors 
which is possibly tied to their unique human capital.  
 
 
2.4.4. Stakeholder theory  
 
This theory, in juxtaposition to agency theory, takes into account the view of wider 
stakeholder groups instead of only shareholders (Mallin, 2010). Stakeholders who do business 
with companies can directly or indirectly influence corporate governance (Thomsen & 
Conyon, 2012). Company should not only maximize shareholder value but also accommodate 
others stakeholders’ interest at once. These are examples of important stakeholders for a 
company: government; society; media; NGOs; creditors; employee; customers; suppliers; etc.  
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Mallin (2010) argues that stakeholders and shareholders may favor different corporate 
governance structures and monitoring mechanisms. Discussing further, companies with 
Anglo-American model, such as in UK and US, emphasize shareholder value and the boards 
comprise of executive and non-executive directors elected by shareholders. Meanwhile, the 
German model, for instance Scandinavian countries, focuses on certain stakeholder group 
such as employees, who has right to vote their representative to sit along with the board. In 
China, as aforementioned, government could be on top priority among other stakeholders so 
that companies tend to have director with political background. In Japan, a country with high 
degree of collectivism, long-term relationship between company and employee is more 
important than short-term financial goals. Overall across Asia-Pacific countries, the role of 
non- executive independent director is emphasized and almost every country requires a 
minimum proportion of it. Independent directors give a positive sign to stakeholders in which 
their interests are accommodated.  
With respect to board diversity, it would be best if board of director could represent 
stakeholders of the company, for instance employee representative as mentioned before. 
Besides, regarding to internationalization, appointment of foreign board member could be a 
good way for multinational company to “represent” its stakeholders in international 
environment (Kang et al., 2007). In addition, Francoeur et al. (2008) explain that there is a 
pressure for companies to appoint women as directors from shareholder; large institutional 
investors; politicians; activists; consumer groups; or other stakeholders. Thence, stakeholder 
theory can be a useful grid to explain this phenomenon and its consequences.  
 
2.4.5. Prior empirical studies 
 
Significant numbers of prior empirical study have been already conducted to examine the 
relationship between board diversity and financial performance. Some of them address board 
size or board independent such as De Andres et al. (2005); Kiel and Nicholson (2003); and 
Nicholson and Kiel (2007). Besides, other researches as well as this research focus on 
demographic aspect, particularly in nationality and gender diversity. Hillman et al. (2002), for 
instance, examine how female and racial minority directors in the United States differ from 
white male directors. Using samples of Fortune 1000 firms, they infer that female and 
African-American directors more likely come from non-business background. In addition, 
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they are more likely to hold advanced educational degrees, and involved in multiple boards 
faster than white male directors.  
 
Next, Ruigrok et al. (2007), using sample of 1678 directors in 210 Swiss publicly listed firms, 
find that foreign directors tend to be more independent while women directors are more likely 
to be affiliated to company by family ties. In addition, Erhardt et al. (2003) also investigate 
127 large companies in the United States; addressing their board demographic diversity in 
gender and ethnicity. The result shows both gender and ethnic diversity is positively 
associated with company performance as measured with return on assets (ROA) and return on 
investment (ROI) as financial indicators.  
 
A research on board diversity is also conducted by Ben‐amar, Francoeur, Hafsi, and Labelle 
(2013). They study about board diversity configuration on merger and acquisition (M&A) 
performance in Canadian firms. The effect can be observed in the two following figures. The 
first figure indicates a negative effect at lower level and positive effect at higher level of 
board diversity on board strategic decision and eventually performance. Thus, it implies a 
threshold level beyond which demographic diversity gives positive effect on performance as 
presented in the second figure about the relationship between demographic diversity and 
performance.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.6: The path diagram of diversity and ownership influences on board strategic 
decisions 
Source: Ben‐amar et al. (2013) 
29 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7: The relationship between board demographic diversity and performance 
Source: Ben‐amar et al. (2013) 
 
Furthermore, Anderson, Reeb, Upadhyay, and Zhao (2011) study the potential cost and 
benefit of building diversity on board of director. They use Tobin’s Q as a proxy of financial 
performance and measure board diversity with six dimensions included gender and 
nationality. The empirical result indicates that a heterogeneous pool of directors positively 
affects firm performance. This result implies that board diversity improves board efficiency 
and is considered by investors as protecting or benefiting their interests. Besides, board 
diversity is also related to operational complexity. When a company faces complex 
operations, a diverse board increases performance. Conversely, it exhibits a negative impact 
on performance in a company with less complex operating environments. 
 
Additionally, Carter et al. (2003) examine board diversity-firm value relationship and 
demonstrate a significant positive relationship after controlling for size, industry and other 
corporate governance measures. Then, seven years later, Carter et al. (2010) claim another 
fact: no significant relationship between gender or ethnic diversity on board and firm financial 
performance. In the later research, Carter et al. also take into account important board 
committees. Both researches are conducted in American firms but use different sampling 
criteria: Fortune 1000 firms and S&P 500 firms. Moreover, they suggest that the effect of 
board diversity in gender and ethnicity on firm financial performance appears to be 
endogenous.  
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Other researchers, Kim et al. (2010), emphasize that academics research in this field echoes 
these dual sentiments and they are almost equally divided into whether or not board quality 
and firm performance are positively related. In this regard, decisions concerning the 
appointment of women or foreign director should not be based solely on future financial 
performance. The demands tend to come from internal or external calls for diversity rather 
than performance-based objectives (Carter et al., 2010; Farrell & Hersch, 2005; Francoeur et 
al., 2008).  
 
Addressing endogeneity issue, several previous researches discuss about it. Borsch and Koke 
(2002) in Bozec et al. (2010) make the point that endogeneity is caused by structural reverse 
causality and spurious correlation. Structural reverse causality means that the influence of 
board diversity on firm performance is not necessarily to be ex ante (Bozec et al., 2010). It is 
plausible that better performing companies may enhance board diversity to address public 
concerns (Anderson et al., 2011). Therefore, it is difficult to distinguish whether a diverse 
board increases firm performance or high performance firms demand for board diversity 
(Ahern & Dittmar, 2012; Oxelheim et al., 2013). Spurious correlation refers to a condition 
when an unobserved variable determines corporate governance and performance relationship 
simultaneously. A positive correlation between them may occur whereas in reality the 
estimated coefficients are overestimated reflecting spurious correlation instead of a causal 
relationship (Bozec et al., 2010).  
 
Furthermore, Ben‐amar et al. (2013) suggest a balance board diversity to best serve firm’s 
purpose. However, they argue that board diversity effect on firm performance is multi-
factorial; it depends on contextual factors. Among those influential factors, there are corporate 
complexity and managerial control as stated in Anderson et al. (2011). In circumstances 
where complex business environment exists, it might be beneficial to have varying 
capabilities and talents in board diversity. However, the effect can be different when it comes 
to lower level of operation complexity (Anderson et al., 2011; Ben‐amar et al., 2013). In this 
research, I attempt to reduce the endogeneity issue by using instrumental variable and two-
stage least square regression as suggested by Oxelheim and Randøy (2003).  
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2.5. Hypothesis Formulation 
 
This research proposes two hypotheses, in which financial performance is the dependent 
variable for both. Board diversity is divided into two independent variables. In the first 
hypothesis, gender diversity is the independent variable. This is measured by the number of 
female director. The second independent variable is nationality which is measured by the 
number of foreign director. 
 
Involvement of women in business is increasing and followed by greater number of women 
assigned to the board. As cited from Nielsen and Huse (2010), ratio of women directors is 
positively associated with board strategic control and board effectiveness. The role of women 
on board can increase board development activities and decrease level of conflict. Women 
have different leadership styles compared to the opposite gender. In addition, Adams and 
Ferreira (2009) find that female directors have better performance and attendance than male 
directors. Female directors are also more likely to join monitoring committees and gender-
diverse boards allocate more effort in monitoring.  
 
Regarding to firm financial performance, as previously mentioned, Erhardt et al. (2003) found 
that the percentage of women in board of director is positively associated firm financial 
performance. Supporting this, Carter et al. (2003) also indicate a significant positive 
relationships between board diversity and Tobin’s Q as the indicator of firm value. They also 
state that the proportion of female director increases with firm size and board size. However, 
this proportion decreases when the number of inside director increases. 
 
In addition, Smith et al. (2006) do a panel study on 2500 largest Danish companies. This 
study investigates the role of women, both in top management and board of director, and its 
relationship with firm performance. The findings show that female members on board of 
directors, who are elected by the employee, have positive effects on firm financial 
performance.  
 
Campbell and Mínguez-Vera (2008) also highlight the same evidence from Spain. They try to 
examine the link between gender diversity, which is measured by the percentage of female 
director, and firm financial performance. They mention that Spain has had very limited 
women participation on workforce, but now equality of opportunities has been improved. 
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Using panel data analysis, they affirm that gender diversity has a positive effect on firm value 
and this may generate economic gains. Hence, the first hypothesis can be formulated as 
follows.  
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Gender diversity of board member has a positive influence on financial 
performance  
 
Furthermore, another variable which can affect firm financial performance is nationality 
diversity in board of director. Regarding to this, Ruigrok et al. (2007) indicate that foreign 
board members are more likely to be independent and hold lower numbers of directorships in 
other companies. Peterson et al. (2007) also examine participation of African-Americans on 
board of director and board committees of the United States’ Fortune 500. They find that 
ethnic plays a role in determining assignment to corporate board committees.  
 
Then, Choi et al. (2007) investigate the valuation impact of outside independent director 
requirement in Korea after Asian financial crisis. One of the findings is a positive effect of 
foreign directors on firm financial performance. The foreign board members are normally 
foreign investors who participate in corporate boards of directors.  
 
Additionally, Oxelheim and Randøy (2003) analyze the effect of foreign board member on 
corporate performance which is measured by Tobin’s Q. Their samples are Norwegian and 
Swedish firms and their result shows a significant positive impact. They note that recruitment 
of an outsider Anglo-American director indicates a significantly higher firm value than 
Anglo-American director and this can be seen as an alternative to reduce cost of capital. 
 
In the more recent studies, Oxelheim et al. (2013) expand their sample to Denmark, Finland, 
Norway and Sweden. The result shows that the percentage of foreign board member is related 
to financial internationalization rather than international sales. They also conclude some 
elements that should be considered in recruiting foreign directors:  
 
1. Access benefit of larger pool of capital.  
For example, an Asian company can get access of capital market in another country 
such as United States. 
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2. Necessity of changing board language and internationalizing the board. 
Having a foreign board member may demand language change in a boardroom. A 
Japanese firm should change the board communication to English when an American 
director added, for instance. 
3. The importance of signaling compliance with international governance standards. 
By recruiting an Anglo-Saxon board member, an Asian firm then will indirectly 
‘import’ and adapt Anglo-Saxon corporate governance standards.  
 
Moreover, Carter et al. (2003) also conduct research on directors from ethnic minorities in 
United States’ Fortune 100 firms. Members of the board considered as ethnic minorities are 
those African Americans, Asians, and Hispanics. They conclude a significant positive 
relationship between those ethnic minorities on board and firm value. Correspondingly, 
Erhardt et al. (2003) support that foreign or minority director positively influences ROA and 
ROI as financial indicators of firm performance. Thus, the second hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Nationality of board member has a positive influence on financial 
performance  
 
Additionally, prior researches identify several control variables that might also affect the 
relationship of board diversity and firm financial performance (Carter et al., 2003; Erhardt et 
al., 2003; Oxelheim & Randøy, 2003). There are three control variables used in this study, 
namely: board size, board independent and firm size. Oxelheim and Randøy (2003) include 
those control variable in their research on the impact of foreign board membership and firm 
value. Moreover, Carter et al. (2003) also find that the proportion of women and ethnic 
minorities on boards increases along with firm size and board size. As for Erhardt et al. 
(2003), they add firm size as a control variable when examining board diversity and firm 
performance. Firm size is a firm-specific control variable. Large firms are more likely to have 
international activities and complexity that calls for diversity (Oxelheim et al., 2013). Then, 
board size is included as larger boards are inherently more diverse (Anderson et al., 2011). 
Further, greater director independence from management potentially improves monitoring and 
controlling roles of the board and independent directors might be more heterogeneous 
(Anderson et al., 2011). Therefore, board independence is also added as control variable. 
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2.6. Research Model  
 
Addressing all variables involved, the research model of this study can be presented as in this 
following figure.  
 
          H1  
      
          H2 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.8: Research Model  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gender Diversity  
Financial Performance 
Nationality  
Control variables: 
- Board independence 
- Board size  
- Firm size 
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Chapter 3 
 Research Methods 
 
The third part of this thesis presents methodology employed in this research. This particularly 
discusses about data collection and sample selection; variables; and hypothesis test. The aim 
of research methods explanation is to answer the question about how the data are gathered; 
what sampling method is used; and how the variables are measured. The systematic procedure 
of hypothesis testing is also presented in this section. 
 
3.1. Data Collection and Sample Selection 
 
In this research, secondary data is employed.  According to Hair, Money, Samouel, and Page 
(2007) secondary data is data that was not gathered directly and purposefully for the research 
project. In other words, the data are gathered from sources that already exist (Sekaran & 
Bougie, 2010). The following are several advantages of using secondary data (Hair et al., 
2007): 
- resource efficiency;  
- evaluation capacity;  
- potential for comparative analysis;  
- avoid respondent fatigue;  
- potential for triangulation; and  
- potential for new insight 
 
Meanwhile, some potential disadvantages of secondary data are: misalignment of purpose; 
access complication; quality concern; and age of data. The data in question are collected from 
Datastream and firm’s annual reports. 
 
As for this study, the unit of analysis is company or organization level. As mentioned 
previously, research geographical setting is in Asia. Unit of analysis is defined as what or who 
should provide the data and at what level of aggregation (Zikmund et al., 2013). Sekaran 
(2003) also explains about unit of analysis; it is the level of aggregation of the data collected 
during subsequent data analysis stage and this depends on the research questions. The level of 
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aggregation can be in individuals, dyads, groups, households, departments, organizations, or 
geographical area (Sekaran, 2003; Zikmund et al., 2013). 
 
In relation to the time horizon, this is a longitudinal study in which the data on dependent 
variable are gathered at two or more points of time to answer the research question (Sekaran, 
2003). Thus, this study combines cross sectional and time series data called pooled or 
longitudinal data. It is a study over time of a group of research subjects (Gujarati, 2003).  
 
The observed data as population is all companies in Asia-Pacific. The sample for this study is 
Forbes Asia-Pacific’s 50 biggest listed companies 2013. Those companies have been selected 
by Forbes Asia based on certain criteria such as minimum $3 billion of annual revenue or 
market capitalization. Each company’s track record also has been reviewed for profits, 
revenue, returns on capital and share-price movements. Company with too much debt or 
owned by government at least half of the shares was eliminated. Finally, Forbes Asia selected 
the 50 biggest companies. As for this study, the analyzed data are those companies during five 
years (from 2008 up to 2012). 
 
The sample member is selected based on purposive sampling method. It is a non-probability 
sampling technique in which sample members are selected based upon some appropriate 
characteristics (Zikmund et al., 2013). Non-probability sampling method means that the 
elements of population do not have any probability to be selected as sample subjects (Sekaran 
& Bougie, 2010). From the 50 companies examined in this research, only 37 of them could be 
processed in data analysis. The rest of the companies could not provide sufficient data needed. 
Hence, 37 companies multiplied by 5 years equals to 185 observations in total. 
 
3.2. Variables  
 
The dependent variable in this study is financial performance while the independent variables 
are nationality and gender diversity of board member. In addition, there are three control 
variables, namely board independence, board size and firm size.  The following discussions 
elaborate those variables in this research. 
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Financial Performance  
 
According to Zikmund et al. (2013), dependent variable is a process outcome that can be 
predicted or explained by other variables. Dependent variable, which is also known as 
criterion variable, is the primary interest of researchers who are willing to understand, 
describe, or explain its variability (Sekaran, 2003). Financial performance as the dependent 
variable of this research is related to how efficient company using its capital to generate profit 
(Van Horne, 1998) . It is measured by Tobin’s Q in this research and the data are obtained 
from Datastream. The formula is as the following (Chen & Tan, 2012) in which annual 
market value is used for equity market value while common stock is used for equity book 
value. 
 
Tobin’s Q = (Equity market value +Liabilities book value) 
          (Equity book value + Liabilities book value)  
 
 
Nationality and Gender Diversity 
 
Meanwhile, independent variable refers to variable that is expected to influence the dependent 
variable (Zikmund et al., 2013). Independent variable, which is also known as predictor 
variable, influences the dependent variable in some way, either positive or negative (Sekaran, 
2003). In relation to dependent variable, any changes in independent variable will affect the 
dependent variable.  
 
The independent variables of this research are nationality and gender diversity. Gender 
diversity is measured by the number of female director while nationality is measured by the 
number of foreign director on board. For female and foreign director information, the data are 
obtained from the annual reports from each company. As we know, annual reports provide 
sufficient information related to gender. It is identified using photographs and biographical 
information of board of directors in the annual report for each company. About foreign 
director, if they are not stated in the annual report, names and biography information are used 
to identify their origin. Those sources are rechecked by using other web-based data such as 
company account in Forbes, Bloomberg’s Executive Profile & Biography, local publication, 
etc. The aim of this verification is to secure validity (Oxelheim et al., 2013). 
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Board Independence, Board Size and Firm Size 
 
In addition to the independent and dependent variables, control variable are also presented 
here. This control variable is used to minimize or reduce the mistakes that might happen in 
this research, for instance misspecification of model, misinterpretation and miscalculation 
data. There are three control variables used, namely board independence, board size, and firm 
size (Carter et al., 2003; Erhardt et al., 2003; Oxelheim & Randøy, 2003). Board size refers to 
the number of board member in total. Board independence is measured by the number of 
independent director on board. The data sources for independent director and board size are 
also firms’ annual reports. Besides, natural logarithm of total assets is used as a proxy of firm 
size.  
 
In summary, the variables can be presented as follows. 
Variables Measurements Expected Relationship 
Independent variables 
Gender  
Nationality  
Control variables 
Board Independence 
Board Size 
Firm Size 
 
Number of female director 
Number of foreign director 
 
Number of Independent director 
Total number of board member 
Natural logarithm of total assets  
 
+ 
+ 
 
+ 
+/- 
+ 
Table 3.1: Variables  
 
 
3.3. Hypothesis test 
 
According to Sekaran and Bougie (2010), there are several steps in testing hypothesis.  
1. Determine the null and alternate hypotheses 
2. Select the appropriate statistical test 
3. Determine the level of significance desired 
4. See the result whether the level of significance is met 
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The null hypothesis is defined as hypothesis with samples taken from populations with equal 
means for dependent variable (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010).  Then, this hypothesis 
can be rejected or accepted based on statistical test results. Null hypothesis is set up to be 
rejected in order to support the alternate hypothesis (Sekaran & Bougie, 2010). Alternate 
hypothesis is a statement that express a relationship between two variables or differences 
between two groups (Sekaran & Bougie, 2010).  
 
If the null hypothesis is rejected, this implies that board diversity influences financial 
performance. Then, the relationship direction could be either positive (implying that board 
diversity enhances financial performance) or negative (suggesting that board diversity 
decreases financial performance). On the other hand, failure to reject the null hypothesis 
suggests that diversity in board of director does not add value. The null hypothesis in this 
research is as the following while the alternate hypothesis is H1 and H2 indicating a positive 
relationship as aforementioned. 
 
H0: ρ = 0 
 H1: ρ >0  
H2: ρ >0 
 
 
The statistical method used in hypothesis testing is multiple regression analysis that will be 
further discussed in the next section. The level of significance (p-value or alpha level) of 0.05 
(5%) is determined. Significance level is a critical probability related to a statistical 
hypothesis test. That indicates how likely an inference supports a difference between an 
observed value and some statistical expectation is true (Zikmund et al., 2013). 
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Chapter 4 
 Data Analysis and Results 
 
 
This part describes the method used in analyzing data. Several tests needed in this study are 
explained respectively. Then, the test results are presented using table to summary and explain 
better the important points. The main data analysis used is multiple regression. Additionally, 
the steps and tests within it such as assumption tests for linear regression are also elaborated.  
4.1. Data Analysis  
 
This is a quantitative research wherein the data are processed using multiple regression 
analysis. Multiple regression analysis is a statistical technique to analyze the relationship 
between a single dependent variable and several independent variables (Sekaran & Bougie, 
2010). The independent variables are used to predict the dependent variable. Multiple 
regression analysis is an appropriate analysis to study research problems in this study. 
According to Hair et al. (2010), multiple regression analysis falls into two broad classes of 
research problems, namely prediction and explanation. Prediction indicates to which extent 
independent variable can explain dependent variable. Then, explanation involves the 
regression coefficient of each independent variable and attempts to develop a theoretical or a 
substantive reason for the effect of the independent variable (Hair et al., 2010). 
 
A linear combination of independent variables that best predicts a dependent variable is called 
regression equation or regression model (Sekaran & Bougie, 2010). According to Zikmund et 
al. (2013, p. 587), a linear multiple regression equation is as follows. 
 
Y= b0 + b1 X1 + b2 X2 + b3 X3 +b4 X4 +b5 X5 +   
 
Y = dependent variable  
X = independent variable  
b0 = constant, which equals to the mean if slope coefficients are zero  
b = slope coefficient associated with each independent variable 
e = random error or residual  
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Based on the equation above, the regression equation for this study can be formulated as 
follows. 
 
Financial Performance = Constant+b1 Gender Diversity +b2 Nationality +b3 Board 
Independence +b4 Board Size +b5 Firm Size +   
 
In multiple regression test, analysis of variance (ANOVA) is conducted. This is a hypothesis 
test to determine whether statistically significant differences in means occur between two or 
more groups; involving investigation of one treatment variable effects on an interval-scaled 
dependent variable (Zikmund et al., 2013).  ANOVA examines one dependent variable and 
two or more independent variables as in this research. 
 
Furthermore, Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS) regression is also used in addition to Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS) regression in order to mitigate possible endogeneity in this research. 
According to Zikmund et al. (2013), OLS regression is a technique that guarantees the 
resulting straight line in linear regression will produce the least total error in using 
independent variable as the predictor of dependent variable. This procedure generates a 
straight line which minimizes the sum of squared deviations of the actual values from the 
predicted regression line. The ordinary least square equation as cited from Zikmund et al. 
(2013, p. 571) is as follows. 
 
   
 
 
   
           
 
ei =       (the residual) 
   = actual observed value of the dependent variable 
    = estimated value of the dependent variable 
n = number of observation 
i = number of particular observation 
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Oxelheim and Randøy (2003) highlight that board composition might be endogenously 
determined. For instance, a higher firm performance could be a result of foreign directors’ 
influence, but could also be a factor attracting potential foreign directors to serve that 
particular high-performing firm. As recommended by Oxelheim and Randøy (2003), we use a 
two-stage least square regression to address the possible endogeneity problem. Two-stage 
least square method is designed to replace endogenous explanatory variable by a linear 
combination of predetermined variables and use it instead of the original endogenous variable 
(Gujarati, 2003). Hence, the role of instrumental variable is needed as the predetermined 
variable, a proxy of endogenous variable. In this research, firm size is used as the instrumental 
variable to overcome endogeneity (Carter et al., 2003; Oxelheim & Randøy, 2003). 
 
 
Zikmund et al. (2013) also propose the step by step of interpreting a multiple regression 
model. 
 
1. Examine model (F-test) 
F-test is a procedure to determine whether more variability is explained or not 
explained by the regression. It is conducted to test the statistical significance of the 
model by comparing variations explained by regression equation to residual error 
variation. If the result is not significant, data analysis cannot be continued and the 
model is supposed to be dismissed because the regression equation cannot be used. 
This is the F-test equation as cited from Zikmund et al. (2013, p. 588).  
 
  
        
               
   
   
   
 
 
SSR = sum of squares for regression  
SSE = error sum of squares  
MSR = mean squared regression 
MSE = mean squared error 
k = number of independent variable 
n= sample size 
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2. Examine individual statistical test for each parameter estimation  
This point addresses the b1, b2 … bn in regression equation which is also called 
regression coefficient. This coefficient is actually the slope of X on Y. A positive 
value of coefficient indicates a positive relationship of independent variable on 
dependent variable and vice versa.  
 
3. Examine coefficient of determination (R-square) 
R-square is the correlation of coefficient squared or coefficient of determination. This 
means that the percentage of total variations of Y is explained by all independent 
variables in the regression model  (Hair et al., 2010; Zikmund et al., 2013). It is 
obtained by squaring the proportion of total variance of a variable accounted for by 
another variable; as stated in Zikmund et al. (2013, p. 564) : 
 
    
                  
              
 
 
Additionally, adjusted R-square is also an important point. It is a modified measure of 
R-square which takes into account sample size and the number of independent 
variables within regression (Hair et al., 2010). 
 
4. Examine collinearity diagnostic 
This part examines about multicollinearity and will be discussed more in the 
regression assumptions part. 
 
Furthermore, there are several assumptions need to be achieved in multiple regression. Before 
performing regression analysis, several test are conducted in this research, namely: normality, 
multicollinearity, autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity (Gujarati, 2003; Hair et al., 2010). 
Regression test and regression assumption test are performed using IBM SPSS (Statistical 
Package for the Social Sciences) Statistics 21
th
 version. 
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4.2. Results  
 
4.2.1. Descriptive Statistics  
 
Descriptive statistics describe basic characteristics and summarize data in a simple and 
understandable manner (Zikmund et al., 2013). Presenting this statistic, it will be easier to 
capture the whole portrait of the sample used to represent population. Among 37 companies 
as sample members, their countries of origin and board systems can be observed as in this 
following figure. 
 
Country Number of Companies 
 
Australia 
China 
Hong Kong  
India 
Indonesia 
Philippines 
Singapore 
South Korea 
Thailand 
Total  
 
 
1 
12 
3 
11 
1 
3 
1 
3 
2 
37 
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics 1 
 
 
Board System Number of Companies 
 
One-tier  
Two-Tier 
 
 
24 
13 
Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics 2 
 
 
As we can see, the sample members originate from nine Asian countries. These countries 
represent each region in Asia. East Asia is represented by China, Hong Kong and South 
Korea. South East Asia is represented by Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. 
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Meanwhile, India represents West Asia and Australia represents Oceania. For the board 
system of sample member, it is indicated that 24 companies of the sample are one-tier board 
system while the rest 13 companies use two-tier board system.  
 
Further, the next figure presents the descriptive statistics table; in which we can see the mean 
value, minimum value, maximum value and standard deviation of each variable. There are 
185 observations in total from 37 companies during five years. Mean is the arithmetic 
average, a measure of central tendency (Zikmund et al., 2013). Standard deviation is a 
quantitative index of variability or distribution spread (Zikmund et al., 2013). This is the 
square root of the distribution variance. Using mean and standard deviation helps to 
understand and interpret the data.   
 
Variables Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum  
 
Firm Performance  
Gender Diversity 
Nationality Diversity 
Board Independence 
Board Size 
Firm Size 
 
 
0.54 
0.96 
1.43 
4.29 
10.50 
18.23 
 
0.18 
0.89 
1.59 
1.66 
2.59 
2.32 
 
 
0.10 
0 
0 
2 
7 
13.26 
 
0.93 
5 
6 
9 
16 
26.81 
Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics 3 
 
4.2.2. Normality  
 
Normality refers to the shape of distribution for an individual metric variable and its 
correspondence to the normal distribution (Hair et al., 2010). If variation from the normal 
distribution is large, statistical test is invalid because normality is a requirement of F-test and 
t-test (Hair et al., 2010). In this research, normality test is performed using histogram of 
residuals and normal probability plots method. In histogram, data distribution should follow 
the normal distribution curve. In normal probability plot, residuals will be plotted. If they 
follow the straight diagonal line, the data are normally distributed and vice versa. According 
to Hair et al. (2010), normal probability plots method  is better than histogram. 
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Figure 4.1: Histogram 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Normal Probability Plot 
 
The result for normality test as shown in histogram shows that the histogram follows normal 
distribution curve. In normal probability plot, it is also indicated that the data follow the 
diagonal line. Hence, we can conclude that the data for this research is normally distributed. 
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4.2.3. Heteroscedasticity  
 
According to Hair et al. (2010), the dispersion or variance of dependent variable value must 
be equal relatively to each value of independent variable. If the dispersion is not equal, the 
relationship is heteroscedastic. For heteroscedasticity, residual plot analysis is conducted. As 
presented in the following figure, the scatter plot does not show any specific pattern formed. 
As a consequent, the data in this research is free from heteroscedasticity. 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Scatter plot  
 
 
4.2.4. Multicollinearity and Autocorrelation  
 
Multicollinearity is defined as the extent to which variables in multiple regression analysis are 
related each other (Zikmund et al., 2013). High multicollinearity makes individual parameter 
estimation difficult or impossible (Zikmund et al., 2013). Multicollinearity is tested using 
tolerance and VIF (Variance Inflation Factor). Tolerance is the amount of selected 
independent variable which is not explained by the other independent variables; the value 
should approach 1 (Cooper & Schindler, 2008; Hair et al., 2010). The smaller the tolerance, 
the higher a variable is predicted by other independent variables. Besides, VIF is the inverse 
of tolerance value. It is an indicator of the other independent variables effect on the standard 
error of a regression coefficient in which high values of VIF express high degree of 
48 
 
collinearity (Hair et al., 2010). VIF in collinearity statistics should be < 10 (Cooper & 
Schindler, 2008).  
 
In addition, autocorrelation refers to correlation between members of series of observations 
ordered in time (for time series data) or space (for cross-sectional data) (Gujarati, 2003). 
Autocorrelation test is conducted using Durbin-Watson method. According to Gujarati 
(2003), if the value of d approaches 0, it indicates positive autocorrelation. Meanwhile, if the 
value approaches 4, it indicates negative autocorrelation. The ideal value of d should be 
around 2 (Gujarati, 2003). 
 
The result for multicollinearity and autocorrelation test is described in the table below. All 
tolerances values are approaching 1 and VIF values are less than 10. In conclusion, it appears 
to be no multicollinearity in the data. The Durbin-Watson test result shows possible positive 
autocorrelation. However, this issue appears not to be a major problem, as I inspect the results 
by using graphical method, and inspect residual values after further re-run of tests. 
 
Variables                  Collinearity 
Tolerance                       VIF 
Durbin-
Watson 
Gender  
Nationality  
Independence 
Board Size 
Firm Size 
 0.812 
0.855 
0.774 
0.710 
0.933 
1.231 
1.129 
1.293 
1.408 
1.072 
0.609 
 
Table 4.4: Multicollinearity and Autocorrelation  
 
4.2.5. Multiple Regressions Analysis 
 
This section presents the result of multiple regression analysis.  As seen in the Table 4.5, the 
value of F is 16.265 and its significance is 0.000 (p < 0.05). This means that the regression 
model is significant; it explains a significant portion of variation in the dependent variable. 
From the same table, the result shows R-square value of 0.312 meaning that 31.2% of the 
variance in financial performance as the dependent variable is explained by the independent 
variables. Then, the value of adjusted R square is 0,293.  
49 
 
 
F Significance R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
16.265 0.000* 0.312 0.293 
Table 4.5: R square and F-test 
*statistically significant at alpha level 5% 
 
 
Variables Standardized 
Coefficients Beta 
Std. 
Error 
t- value p- value 
 
Gender  
Nationality  
Independence 
Board Size 
Firm Size 
 
0.213 
-0.047 
-0.380 
0.347 
0.301 
 
0.014 
0.008 
0.008 
0.005 
0.005 
 
3.092 
-0.712 
-5.398 
4.725 
4.965 
 
0.002* 
0.477 
0.000* 
0.000* 
0.000* 
 
Table 4.6: Multiple Regression Analysis 
*statistically significant at alpha level 5% 
 
Y= b0 + b1 X1 + b2 X2 + b3 X3 +b4 X4 +b5 X5 +   
 
Based on the result presented in the table above, gender diversity of board member has a 
significant positive influence on financial performance. The value of t-statistic is 3,092 and its 
p-value is 0.002 (p <0.05). The standardized coefficient beta is 0,213 with standard error of 
0.014. This means that null hypothesis is rejected and H1 is supported. However, the result 
shows that nationality of board member does not have any significant influence on financial 
performance (p = 0.477 > 0.05). Since this result is not significant, the other values are 
ignored. In this case, H2 is not supported.  
 
Then, all of the three control variables also have significant influence on financial 
performance. Firstly, board independence significantly influences financial performance. The 
t-value for is -5.398 with p-value 0.000 (p<0.05). The standardized coefficient beta is -0.380 
with standard error 0.008. Secondly, board size also has a significant influence on financial 
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performance. The result indicates 4.725 for t-value, 0.000 for p-value (p<0.05), 0.347 for 
standardized coefficient beta and 0.005 for standard error. Lastly, firm size also shows a 
significant influence on financial performance with t-value 4.965 and p-values 0.000 
(p<0.05). The standardized coefficient beta is 0.301 and standard error is 0.005. 
 
As aforementioned, two-stage least square regression is also performed after ordinary least 
square regression to mitigate endogeneity by using firm size as instrumental variable. The 
result of both regression analyses is as follows. 
 
Descriptions  Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) 
Two-Stage Least 
Square (2SLS) 
 
n 
R Square 
Adjusted R square 
F (significance) 
Gender  
Standardized beta 
t (significance) 
Nationality  
Standardized beta 
t (significance) 
Independence 
Standardized beta 
t (significance) 
Board Size 
Standardized beta 
t (significance) 
Firm Size 
Standardized beta 
t (significance) 
 
 
185 
0.312 
0.293 
16.265 (0.000)* 
 
0.213 
3.092 (0.002)* 
 
-0.047 
-0.712 (0.477) 
 
-0.380 
-5.398 (0.000)* 
 
0.347 
4.725 (0.000)* 
 
0.301 
4.965 (0.000)* 
 
 
185 
0.228 
0.211 
13.270 (0.000)* 
 
0.166 
2.306 (0.022)* 
 
-0.098 
-1.422 (0.157) 
 
-0.391 
-5.246 (0.000)* 
 
0.421 
5.541 (0.000)* 
 
 
 Table 4.7: OLS and 2SLS 
*statistically significant at alpha level 5% 
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As presented above, the results for ordinary least square and two-stage least square 
regressions indicate similar results. This means that endogeneity is not a major problem in this 
research. For the F value, two-stage least square regression gets smaller than ordinary least 
square (13.270) but it is significant (p = 0.000). This implies that the model can be used. The 
R square for two-stage least square regression is 0.228 (adjusted R square 0.211) meaning that 
the independent variables explain 22.8% of the dependent variable.  
 
In two-stage least square regression, gender diversity of board member also shows a 
significant positive influence. The t-value is 2.306 (p-value 0.022 < 0.05) and the 
standardized beta coefficient is 0.166. For nationality diversity of board member, the t-
statistic result is still not significance (p-value 0.157 > 0.05). However, the p-value of 0.157 
in two-stage least square regression is much smaller than 0.477 in ordinary least square 
regression. The control variables also indicate significant influences on financial 
performance; except for firm size which is used as the instrumental variable. For board 
independence, the t-value is -5.246 (p= 0.000 < 0.05) and standardized beta coefficient is -
0.391. For board size, the t-value is 5.541 (p= 0.000 < 0.05) while the standardized beta 
coefficient is 0.421. 
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Chapter 5 
Research Findings and Discussion 
 
In the fifth chapter, the findings of this research will be reviewed in the light of theoretical 
framework and empirical result. Then, the implications of those findings, which are derived 
from the previous section, will be discussed as well. 
 
5.1. Research Findings  
  
5.1.1. The Influence of Gender Diversity of Board Member on Financial Performance 
 
The first independent variable in this research is gender diversity. Previous studies show 
conflicting evidences of the relationship between gender diversity and firm performance 
(Ahern & Dittmar, 2012; Carter et al., 2003). Some studies prove that gender diversity in 
board composition has a positive relationship on financial performance (Campbell & 
Mínguez-Vera, 2008; Carter et al., 2003), whereas some other studies reveal that it does not 
contribute any significant effect (Ahern & Dittmar, 2012; Carter et al., 2010). 
 
Based on the hypothesis test conducted earlier in this research, the result indicates a positive 
influence of gender diversity in board composition on firm financial performance. This 
implies that the presence of female director enhances financial performance of the company. 
Thus, having female board member could be an economic advantage. Consistency for this 
result will be elaborated in the next section. 
 
5.1.2. The Influence of Nationality of Board Member on Financial Performance 
 
The second independent variable is nationality of board member. Similar to gender diversity, 
former evidences also highlight that nationality diversity in board composition has a positive 
relationship on financial performance (Carter et al., 2003; Oxelheim & Randøy, 2003). 
However, another study indicates no significant effect (Carter et al., 2010). 
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The empirical result in this study highlights that nationality diversity in board of director has 
no significant influence on firm financial performance. In other words, appointing foreign 
director does not contribute significant value for company.  Hence, this point will be 
discussed further in discussion. 
 
5.1.3. The Influence of Board Independence on Financial Performance 
 
The first control variable is board independence. The statistical result indicates that board 
independence has a negative influence on financial performance. This is inconsistence with 
the theory (Anderson et al., 2011). Assigning independent director provides greater board 
independency which leads to better monitoring role of the board. This is supposed to enhance 
firm performance. However, since board independence is only a control variable in this 
research and not as part of hypothesis, this result can be ignored.  
 
5.1.4. The Influence of Board Size on Financial Performance 
 
The statistical test result shows that board size, as the second control variable, has a 
significant positive impact on financial performance. This means that bigger board size 
increases firm performance. According to Thomsen and Conyon (2012), ability of the board 
to monitor can increase as more directors added. However, other studies show an inverse 
relationship between financial performance and board size because larger size of the board 
may cause poor communication among the members (De Andres et al., 2005; Kiel and 
Nicholson, 2003).  
 
5.1.5. The Influence of Firm Size on Financial Performance 
 
Based on the empirical result, firm size, as the third control variable, also has a significant 
positive influence on firm financial performance. This is consistent with the notion that large 
firms have better financial performance than small firms. In the two-stage least square 
analysis, this variable is used as instrumental variable as suggested by Oxelheim and Randøy 
(2003). The role of instrumental variable is needed as a proxy of endogenous variable. 
 
54 
 
5.2. Discussion  
 
Several former studies of board diversity influence on financial performance show a positive 
result. First, Erhardt et al. (2003) indicate that board diversity is positively associated with 
financial indicators of firm performance. Second, Anderson et al. (2011) highlight that having 
a diverse pool of directors bears a positive relationship on financial performance meaning that 
greater board heterogeneity improves firm performance. Concerning endogeneity and reverse 
causality, their results provide fairly compelling evidence that board diversity influences firm 
performance, not the other way around. Next, Campbell and Mínguez-Vera (2008) also find 
that female directors have a positive effect on firm value. Likewise, their result of the opposite 
causal relationship is not significant. Finally, Carter et al. (2003) also highlight a significant 
positive relationship between women on board of director and financial performance.  
 
In line with some previous evidences (Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, 2008; Carter et al., 2003; 
Erhardt et al., 2003), this study observes that gender diversity in board of director positively 
influences financial performance. According to Bilimoria and Wheeler (2000), Mattis (2000) 
and Selby (2000) in Erhardt et al. (2003), female directors reflects better diversity of firm’s 
customer base and labor pool. Female directors establish a more diverse board which enables 
a broader range of perspectives and opinions to be considered, for instance, in case of conflict.  
 
Addressing women participation on board, gender quota is not widely regulated in Asia. 
Compared to the other parts of the world, women presence in Asian top executives is still very 
limited. To large extent, this is influenced by culture. Asian women are demanded to take care 
of family more than men. Even though they are working, they should be able to play both 
roles as a mother or wife and a career woman. This leads to dramatically decrease of women 
participation in middle or top management from where future directors normally are recruited. 
In conclusion, insignificant number of women on board is not caused by men blocking their 
way but primarily due to the lack of candidates. 
 
Hence, Asian firms are recommended to increase further the number of women on board since 
assigning female director is beneficial as proven in this research. However, this decision 
should not be based solely on future financial objective of the firm. Ahern and Dittmar 
(2012), examining the effect of Norwegian gender quota, highlight that it enforces younger 
and less experienced female board, nicknamed as golden skirt, added to the board room. This 
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sounds a bit risky from economic point of view but, on the other hand, it promotes gender 
equality. 
 
In relation to level of nationality diversity in the board room, Oxelheim and Randøy (2003) 
obtain a significant positive impact on firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q. Erhardt et al. 
(2003) and Carter et al. (2003) also find that foreign directors enhance financial performance. 
However, Carter et al. (2010) support the theoretical position of no significant effect, either 
positive or negative. 
 
Similar to Carter et al. (2010), this research also finds no significance influence of foreign 
directors on financial performance. This might be explained by the reason that benefit of 
having foreign director is limited. It depends on operational complexity of the firm (Anderson 
et al., 2011). Complexity faced by firm in this case could be, for instance, having foreign 
sales; having international subsidiaries; or any other international activities.  
 
Furthermore, Oxelheim et al. (2013), investigating to which extent foreign board member 
needed, find that not only international operation is related to board internationalization but 
also financial internationalization. Ownership structure determines the need of board 
internationalization (Oxelheim et al., 2013). Foreign shareholders are more confident when 
their interest accommodated by foreign board member; moreover when they are the same 
nationality (Oxelheim et al., 2013). In this case, the role of foreign director has a propensity 
for monitoring rather than advising. 
 
Additionally, Aguilera and Jackson (2003) examine determinants for differences in corporate 
governance practice across the globe. Among the determinants they mentioned are 
predominant ownership structure; predominant financial system; and inter-firm networks 
(Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). In countries where market-based systems are dominant (such as 
US and UK),  households invest in companies and minority shareholder interests are 
emphasized (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). Market-based financial system demands for very 
strict corporate governance practices to satisfy its dispersed shareholders. The empirical 
evidences for those countries show that foreign directors increase firm performance (Carter et 
al., 2003; Oxelheim et al., 2013; Oxelheim & Randøy, 2003). Meanwhile in Asia, family 
ownership, bank-based financial system and strong inter-firm network are predominant. The 
demand of good corporate governance comes from more concentrated parties. The practice 
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does not seem as strict as in countries with market-based financial system. This can be a 
reason why board internationalization in Asia does not significantly contribute to enhance 
firm performance.  
 
However, since both firm’s operational internationalization and foreign investors in Asia are 
emerging, appointing foreign board member will still be an advantage. For instance, if a 
Chinese company has a significant number of European and Japanese shareholders, it is 
suggested to appoint foreign board member from Europe or Japan to represent those 
shareholders’ interest. Having foreign directors is also a positive sign of firm 
internationalization that can attract more foreign investments.  
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
 
The closing chapter of this study summarizes and infers the overall research process. This part 
consist of conclusion; limitations of the study and recommendations for future research. 
 
6.1. Conclusion 
 
Despite there have been extensive studies on board of directors (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; 
Carter et al., 2010; Carter et al., 2003; Erhardt et al., 2003), the influence of board diversity on  
financial performance still presents contradictory evidences. This research aims to investigate 
the influence of board diversity on financial performance. More specifically, this research 
examines the influence of nationality and gender diversity in board of director on financial 
performance as measured by Tobin’s Q. The sample applied in this study consists of 37 
companies of Forbes Asia-Pacific 50 biggest listed companies. Pooled data is employed for 
the time period of 2008 to 2012. Then, I use multiple regressions for data analysis. 
 
In analyzing board diversity influence on financial performance, endogeneity issues should be 
regarded. In this research design, endogeneity is mitigated by using instrumental variable and 
using two-stage least square regression. The result of two-stage least square regression shows 
no significant difference from the ordinary least square regression; suggesting that 
endogeneity is not a major problem.  
 
Furthermore, the first research finding suggests that gender diversity has a positive influence 
on firm financial performance. This evidence is consistent with the notion that having female 
directors on the board can increase financial performance as highlighted by Erhardt et al. 
(2003). They argue that assigning women director explores beyond traditional talent pool; 
reflects diversity in firm’s customer and employee based better; and thereby enhances firm 
performance. Similarly, Campbell and Mínguez-Vera (2008) also indicate a positive 
relationship of female director and financial performance. In addition, their result suggests 
that spurious correlation or structural reverse causality is not significant. 
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Next, the second finding implies that there is no significant influence contributed by 
nationality diversity of board member. In other words, foreign directors do not affect financial 
performance of the company they serve. This finding is consistent with the result obtained by 
Carter et al. (2010). They highlight a contingency explanation that the effect of nationality 
diversity in board of director on financial performance can be different under different 
circumstances at different times.  
 
In conclusion, companies are recommended to enhance diversity in board of directors since it 
is beneficial for their performance and board effectiveness. However, establishing board 
diversity by assigning female and foreign directors should not be based only on economic 
reason, but also other reasons related to public policy, such as equality or board 
representativeness. Diversity in board of director will better represent company’s 
stakeholders, such as customers, employees, and shareholders. With the breadth of 
perspectives, a diverse board also enables to bring various skills and deeper insight to the 
board room. Hence, it will lead the board process to be improved, both in decision making 
and problem solving.  
 
6.2. Limitations 
 
There are a number of limitations in this study which I will highlight three. Firstly, the sample 
of this study is relatively small, and with more time available one should have enlarged the 
sample. However, since this is a longitudinal study, the combination of data from 37 
companies during five years (2008-2012) obtains a significant number of total observations, 
in which each firm-year observation would not be totally independent from other firm-year 
observation in the same company. Secondly, this study looks only into a few dimensions of 
diversity, as I do not address issues such as diversity of language and diversity of 
competencies. Thirdly, I only address structural diversity – not diversity of behavior. One 
would expect that structural diversity of boards, such as of gender and nationality, would be 
related to board behavior, but this is an assumption that is not tested within this research.   
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6.3. Recommendations for Future Research 
 
Future studies are suggested to accommodate more measures of diversity, for instance, 
diversity in education, age, tenure and any other demographic measures of diversity. The 
sample, particularly in Asia, should be expanded and more variables should be included. In 
addition, determinants of diversity in board of director should also be examined further such 
as corporate complexity or dominant ownership structure since they are related to board 
diversity. Future research also can try to link board diversity and performance by using 
moderator variables, such as board effectiveness; or context-specific assessment such as board 
performance in crisis situation. 
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Appendix  
 
Ordinary Least Square Regression 
 
Notes 
Output Created 
Comments 
Input 
Data 
Active Dataset 
Filter 
Weight 
Split File 
N of Rows in Working Data File 
Missing Value Handling 
Definition of Missing 
Cases Used 
Syntax 
Resources 
Processor Time 
Elapsed Time 
Memory Required 
Additional Memory Required for Residual Plots 
 
Notes 
Output Created 28-APR-2014 03:52:18 
Comments  
Input 
Data 
C:\Users\heyvon\Documents\thesis.
sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data File 186 
Missing Value Handling 
Definition of Missing 
User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 
Cases Used 
Statistics are based on cases with 
no missing values for any variable 
used. 
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Syntax 
REGRESSION 
  /DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV 
CORR SIG N 
  /MISSING LISTWISE 
  /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS 
BCOV R ANOVA COLLIN TOL 
  /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) 
  /NOORIGIN 
  /DEPENDENT Performance 
  /METHOD=ENTER Female 
Foreign Independent Boardsize 
Firmsize 
  /SCATTERPLOT=(*SRESID 
,*ZPRED) 
  /RESIDUALS DURBIN 
HISTOGRAM(ZRESID) 
NORMPROB(ZRESID). 
Resources 
Processor Time 00:00:05,48 
Elapsed Time 00:00:05,34 
Memory Required 2804 bytes 
Additional Memory Required for Residual Plots 880 bytes 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Performance ,5488564 ,18673048 185 
Female ,96 ,890 185 
Foreign 1,43 1,594 185 
Independent 4,29 1,665 185 
Boardsize 10,50 2,590 185 
Firmsize 18,2286 2,32290 185 
 
 
Correlations 
 Performance Female Foreign Independent 
Pearson Correlation 
Performance 1,000 ,215 -,119 -,161 
Female ,215 1,000 -,251 ,240 
Foreign -,119 -,251 1,000 ,037 
Independent -,161 ,240 ,037 1,000 
Boardsize ,280 ,281 ,083 ,460 
Firmsize ,341 -,053 -,110 ,035 
Sig. (1-tailed) Performance . ,002 ,054 ,014 
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Female ,002 . ,000 ,001 
Foreign ,054 ,000 . ,310 
Independent ,014 ,001 ,310 . 
Boardsize ,000 ,000 ,130 ,000 
Firmsize ,000 ,238 ,068 ,319 
N 
Performance 185 185 185 185 
Female 185 185 185 185 
Foreign 185 185 185 185 
Independent 185 185 185 185 
Boardsize 185 185 185 185 
Firmsize 185 185 185 185 
 
Correlations 
 Boardsize Firmsize 
Pearson Correlation 
Performance ,280 ,341 
Female ,281 -,053 
Foreign ,083 -,110 
Independent ,460 ,035 
Boardsize 1,000 ,170 
Firmsize ,170 1,000 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
Performance ,000 ,000 
Female ,000 ,238 
Foreign ,130 ,068 
Independent ,000 ,319 
Boardsize . ,010 
Firmsize ,010 . 
N 
Performance 185 185 
Female 185 185 
Foreign 185 185 
Independent 185 185 
Boardsize 185 185 
Firmsize 185 185 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
66 
 
Variables Entered/Removed
a
 
Model Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed 
Method 
1 
Firmsize, 
Independent, 
Foreign, 
Female, 
Boardsize
b
 
. Enter 
 
a. Dependent Variable: Performance 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
Model Summary
b
 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Durbin-Watson 
1 ,559
a
 ,312 ,293 ,15698849 ,609 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Firmsize, Independent, Foreign, Female, Boardsize 
b. Dependent Variable: Performance 
 
ANOVA
a
 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 2,004 5 ,401 16,265 ,000
b
 
Residual 4,412 179 ,025   
Total 6,416 184    
 
a. Dependent Variable: Performance 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Firmsize, Independent, Foreign, Female, Boardsize 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) -,007 ,100  -,075 ,941 
Female ,045 ,014 ,213 3,092 ,002 
Foreign -,005 ,008 -,047 -,712 ,477 
Independent -,043 ,008 -,380 -5,398 ,000 
Boardsize ,025 ,005 ,347 4,725 ,000 
Firmsize ,024 ,005 ,301 4,695 ,000 
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Coefficients
a
 
Model Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 
(Constant)   
Female ,812 1,231 
Foreign ,885 1,129 
Independent ,774 1,293 
Boardsize ,710 1,408 
Firmsize ,933 1,072 
 
a. Dependent Variable: Performance 
 
Coefficient Correlations
a
 
Model Firmsize Independent Foreign Female 
1 
Correlations 
Firmsize 1,000 ,031 ,164 ,145 
Independent ,031 1,000 -,032 -,129 
Foreign ,164 -,032 1,000 ,306 
Female ,145 -,129 ,306 1,000 
Boardsize -,212 -,409 -,165 -,250 
Covariances 
Firmsize 2,661E-005 1,247E-006 6,529E-006 1,080E-005 
Independent 1,247E-006 6,244E-005 -1,942E-006 -1,471E-005 
Foreign 6,529E-006 -1,942E-006 5,957E-005 3,413E-005 
Female 1,080E-005 -1,471E-005 3,413E-005 ,000 
Boardsize -5,811E-006 -1,713E-005 -6,769E-006 -1,914E-005 
 
Coefficient Correlations
a
 
Model Boardsize 
1 
Correlations 
Firmsize -,212 
Independent -,409 
Foreign -,165 
Female -,250 
Boardsize 1,000 
Covariances 
Firmsize -5,811E-006 
Independent -1,713E-005 
Foreign -6,769E-006 
Female -1,914E-005 
Boardsize 2,811E-005 
 
a. Dependent Variable: Performance 
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Collinearity Diagnostics
a
 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue Condition Index Variance Proportions 
(Constant) Female Foreign 
1 
1 4,953 1,000 ,00 ,01 ,01 
2 ,645 2,771 ,00 ,21 ,49 
3 ,274 4,253 ,00 ,70 ,45 
4 ,089 7,455 ,02 ,02 ,00 
5 ,031 12,557 ,04 ,04 ,01 
6 ,007 25,731 ,94 ,02 ,04 
 
Collinearity Diagnostics
a
 
Model Dimension Variance Proportions 
Independent Boardsize Firmsize 
1 
1 ,00 ,00 ,00 
2 ,00 ,00 ,00 
3 ,01 ,00 ,01 
4 ,82 ,00 ,03 
5 ,16 ,99 ,04 
6 ,01 ,00 ,93 
 
a. Dependent Variable: Performance 
 
 
Residuals Statistics
a
 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Predicted Value ,2822051 ,9174729 ,5488564 ,10436761 
Std. Predicted Value -2,555 3,532 ,000 1,000 
Standard Error of Predicted Value ,015 ,055 ,027 ,007 
Adjusted Predicted Value ,2733828 ,9217387 ,5489252 ,10489198 
Residual -,36256143 ,40234041 ,00000000 ,15484080 
Std. Residual -2,309 2,563 ,000 ,986 
Stud. Residual -2,335 2,607 ,000 1,002 
Deleted Residual -,37076446 ,41623577 -,00006877 ,15976187 
Stud. Deleted Residual -2,365 2,650 ,000 1,008 
Mahal. Distance ,679 21,470 4,973 3,521 
Cook's Distance ,000 ,100 ,005 ,010 
Centered Leverage Value ,004 ,117 ,027 ,019 
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Residuals Statistics
a
 
 N 
Predicted Value 185 
Std. Predicted Value 185 
Standard Error of Predicted Value 185 
Adjusted Predicted Value 185 
Residual 185 
Std. Residual 185 
Stud. Residual 185 
Deleted Residual 185 
Stud. Deleted Residual 185 
Mahal. Distance 185 
Cook's Distance 185 
Centered Leverage Value 185 
 
a. Dependent Variable: Performance 
 
Charts 
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NPAR TESTS 
  /K-S(NORMAL)=Performance Female Foreign Independent Boardsize Firmsize 
  /MISSING ANALYSIS. 
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NPar Tests 
 
Notes 
Output Created 28-APR-2014 03:56:25 
Comments  
Input 
Data C:\Users\heyvon\Documents\thesis.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data File 186 
Missing Value Handling 
Definition of Missing 
User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 
Cases Used 
Statistics for each test are based on all 
cases with valid data for the variable(s) 
used in that test. 
Syntax 
NPAR TESTS 
  /K-S(NORMAL)=Performance Female 
Foreign Independent Boardsize 
Firmsize 
  /MISSING ANALYSIS. 
Resources 
Processor Time 00:00:00,03 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00,06 
Number of Cases Allowed
a
 87381 
 
a. Based on availability of workspace memory. 
 
One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
 Performance Female Foreign Independent 
N 185 185 185 185 
Normal Parameters
a,b
 
Mean ,5488564 ,96 1,43 4,29 
Std. Deviation ,18673048 ,890 1,594 1,665 
Most Extreme Differences 
Absolute ,044 ,254 ,247 ,229 
Positive ,035 ,254 ,247 ,229 
Negative -,044 -,184 -,185 -,149 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z ,604 3,449 3,362 3,115 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,859 ,000 ,000 ,000 
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One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
 Boardsize Firmsize 
N 185 185 
Normal Parameters
a,b
 
Mean 10,50 18,2286 
Std. Deviation 2,590 2,32290 
Most Extreme Differences 
Absolute ,114 ,113 
Positive ,114 ,113 
Negative -,108 -,089 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 1,552 1,537 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,016 ,018 
 
a. Test distribution is Normal. 
b. Calculated from data. 
 
REGRESSION 
  /MISSING LISTWISE 
  /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA 
  /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) 
  /NOORIGIN 
  /DEPENDENT RES_1 
  /METHOD=ENTER Female Foreign Independent Boardsize Firmsize. 
 
 
Regression 
 
Notes 
Output Created 
Comments 
Input 
Data 
Active Dataset 
Filter 
Weight 
Split File 
N of Rows in Working Data File 
Missing Value Handling 
Definition of Missing 
Cases Used 
Syntax 
Resources 
Processor Time 
Elapsed Time 
Memory Required 
Additional Memory Required for Residual Plots 
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Notes 
Output Created 28-APR-2014 03:57:26 
Comments  
Input 
Data 
C:\Users\heyvon\Documents\thesis.
sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data File 186 
Missing Value Handling 
Definition of Missing 
User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 
Cases Used 
Statistics are based on cases with 
no missing values for any variable 
used. 
Syntax 
REGRESSION 
  /MISSING LISTWISE 
  /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R 
ANOVA 
  /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) 
  /NOORIGIN 
  /DEPENDENT RES_1 
  /METHOD=ENTER Female 
Foreign Independent Boardsize 
Firmsize. 
Resources 
Processor Time 00:00:00,25 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00,34 
Memory Required 2788 bytes 
Additional Memory Required for Residual Plots 0 bytes 
 
 
Variables Entered/Removed
a
 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 
Firmsize, Independent, 
Foreign, Female, 
Boardsize
b
 
. Enter 
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a. Dependent Variable: Unstandardized Residual 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 ,328
a
 ,108 ,083 ,09223582 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Firmsize, Independent, Foreign, Female, 
Boardsize 
 
ANOVA
a
 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression ,184 5 ,037 4,322 ,001
b
 
Residual 1,523 179 ,009   
Total 1,707 184    
 
a. Dependent Variable: Unstandardized Residual 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Firmsize, Independent, Foreign, Female, Boardsize 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) ,102 ,059  1,733 ,085 
Female -,008 ,008 -,075 -,952 ,342 
Foreign -,007 ,005 -,109 -1,450 ,149 
Independent ,018 ,005 ,316 3,931 ,000 
Boardsize -,009 ,003 -,252 -3,008 ,003 
Firmsize ,003 ,003 ,074 1,015 ,311 
 
a. Dependent Variable: Unstandardized Residual 
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Appendix 2 
 
Two-stage Least Squares Regression 
 
Notes 
Output Created 08-MAY-2014 01:34:21 
Comments  
Input 
Data C:\Users\heyvon\Documents\thesis.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data 
File 
186 
Date <none> 
Missing Value Handling 
Definition of Missing 
User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 
Cases Used 
Statistics are based on all cases with 
valid data for all variables across all 
equations. 
Syntax 
2SLS Performance WITH Female 
Foreign Independent Boardsize 
  /INSTRUMENTS Female Foreign 
Independent Boardsize Firmsize 
  /CONSTANT. 
Resources 
Processor Time 00:00:00,06 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00,10 
Time Series Settings (TSET) 
Amount of Output PRINT = DEFAULT 
Saving New Variables NEWVAR = NONE 
Treatment of User-Missing 
Values 
MISSING = EXCLUDE 
Equations Include CONSTANT 
 
Model Description 
 Type of Variable 
Equation 1 
Performance dependent 
Female predictor & instrumental 
Foreign predictor & instrumental 
Independent predictor & instrumental 
Boardsize predictor & instrumental 
Firmsize instrumental 
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Model Summary 
Equation 1 
Multiple R ,477 
R Square ,228 
Adjusted R Square ,211 
Std. Error of the Estimate ,166 
 
 
 
ANOVA 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F 
Equation 1 
Regression 1,461 4 ,365 13,270 
Residual 4,955 180 ,028  
Total 6,416 184   
 
ANOVA 
 Sig. 
Equation 1 
Regression ,000 
Residual  
Total  
 
 
Coefficients 
 Unstandardized Coefficients Beta t 
B Std. Error 
Equation 1 
(Constant) ,401 ,052  7,647 
Female ,035 ,015 ,166 2,306 
Foreign -,011 ,008 -,098 -1,422 
Independent -,044 ,008 -,391 -5,246 
Boardsize ,030 ,005 ,421 5,541 
 
Coefficients 
 Sig. 
Equation 1 
(Constant) ,000 
Female ,022 
Foreign ,157 
Independent ,000 
Boardsize ,000 
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Coefficient Correlations 
 Female Foreign Independent 
Equation 1 Correlations 
Female 1,000 ,290 -,135 
Foreign ,290 1,000 -,037 
Independent -,135 -,037 1,000 
Boardsize -,227 -,135 -,412 
 
Coefficient Correlations 
 Boardsize 
Equation 1 Correlations 
Female -,227 
Foreign -,135 
Independent -,412 
Boardsize 1,000 
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Appendix 3 
 
 
Forbes Asia’s 50 Best Companies 2013 
 
 
http://www.forbes.com/fab50/list/ 
1 Advanced Info Service 
2 Alliance Global Group 
3 Asian Paints 
4 Axis Bank 
5 Ayala Corp 
6 Baidu 
7 Bank Central Asia 
8 Cheng Shin Rubber Industry 
9 China Gas Holdings 
10 China Hongqiao Group 
11 China Vanke 
12 China ZhengTong Auto Services 
13 CP ALL 
14 CSL 
15 CWT 
16 Dr. Reddy's Laboratories 
17 ENN Energy Holdings 
18 Galaxy Entertainment Group 
19 Geely Automobile Holdings 
20 Great Wall Motor 
21 Gree Electric Appliances 
22 HCL Technologies 
23 HDFC Bank 
24 Henan Shuanghui Investment & Development 
25 Hengan International Group 
26 Hisense Electric 
27 Hyundai Glovis 
28 Idea Cellular 
29 ITC 
30 Jollibee Foods 
31 LG Household & Health Care 
32 Longfor Properties 
33 Lupin 
34 Melco Crown Entertainment 
35 Motherson Sumi Systems 
36 Naver* 
37 Pegatron 
38 Poly Real Estate Group 
39 Qingdao Haier 
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40 Sapura Kencana Petroleum 
41 SJM Holdings 
42 Skyworth Digital Holdings 
43 Sun Pharmaceutical Industries 
44 Suzhou Gold Mantis Construction Decoration 
45 Tata Consultancy Services 
46 Tencent Holdings 
47 Tingyi Holding 
48 Titan 
49 Want Want China Holdings 
50 Wharf (Holdings) 
